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THE SELF-JUDGING WTO SECURITY EXCEPTION
Roger P. Alford*
I. INTRODUCTION
The World Trade Organization (WTO) is a remarkably successful
international body. Now in its sixteenth year, it boasts 153 Member States and an
additional thirty countries pursuing membership.' Only fifteen countries of the
world-all small and economically insignificant-are not in the WTO or
clamoring to join it. 2 The WTO Member States and applicant countries account for
99.95 percent of world trade, 99.97 percent of world Gross Domestic Product
(GDP), and 99.30 percent of the world's population.
Equally remarkable is the success of the WTO's judicial branch, the Dispute
Settlement Body (DSB). Four hundred twenty-nine complaints have been filed
with the WTO, an average of over twenty-five cases per year.4 WTO panels have
rendered 179 decisions,5 more in seventeen years than the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) decided in sixty-three years.6 The overwhelming majority of these
decisions-almost ninety percent-result in a finding of WTO violations.7 Even
more remarkable, the respondent State complies with adverse decisions over ninety
*C© 2011 Roger P. Alford. Visiting Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School;
Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law. Thanks to Raj Bhala, Jeffrey
Dunoff, Andrew Guzman, Simon Lester, Mary Ellen O'Connell and the faculty of Notre
Dame Law School for their comments during a faculty workshop. The research assistance
of Brendan Geary is also greatly appreciated.
The thirty countries pursuing membership are Afghanistan, Algeria, Andorra,
Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Belarus, Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Comoros, Equatorial
Guinea, Ethiopia, Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Laos, Libya, Montenegro, Russia, Samoa, Sao
Tom6, Serbia, Seychelles, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, and Yemen.
2 These countries are: East Timor, Eritrea, Kiribati, Kosovo, North Korea, Marshall
Island, Micronesia, Monaco, Nauru, Palau, San Marino, Somalia, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu,
and the Vatican.
' Handbook on Accession to the WTO, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.
org/english/thewtoe/acce/cbt course e/clslpl e.htm (last visited June 16, 2011).
4 As of March 7, 2012, there have been 429 complaints filed. See Chronological List
of Dispute Cases, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispu e/
dispustatus e.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2012).
See WTO Panel Reports, WORLDTRADELAW.NET, http://www.worldtradelaw.net/
reports/wtopanels/wtopanels.asp (last visited March 7, 2012); Current Status of Disputes,
WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispu e/dispucurrentstatus
e.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2012).
6 According to the ICW, 151 cases have been filed and fifteen of those are still
pending. See Cases, INT'L COURT OF JUSTICE, http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.
php?p1=3 (last visited June 16, 2011).
For examples of some of the most contentious disputes involving hundreds of
millions in dispute, see infra note 350.
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percent of the time.' In short, the WTO docket is almost always full, the
complainant State almost always wins, and the respondent State almost always
complies.
Given this impressive record, it is surprising to find in the WTO an
unreviewable trump card, an exception to all WTO rules that can be exercised at
the sole discretion of a Member State-the WTO security exception. Yet that is
what the exception essentially is: a self-judging provision that a Member State can
invoke whenever "it considers" a measure to be "necessary for the protection of its
essential security interests."9 As one skeptical delegate from Argentina stated in
1982-responding to the European Union's invocation of the security exception in
the Falkland War-it is "a magnificent safeguard clause" that allows any country
to take security action without it "having to be justified or approved" by anyone.' 0
He was correct, and a generation later his country would become the strongest
proponent of unreviewable security exceptions."
Concerns about abuse of the security exception were recognized from the
beginning. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiators feared
that the exception would create a "very big loophole in the whole [GATT]
Charter." 2 The delegation from the United States, which drafted the exception,
shared this concern stating that there "was a great danger of having too wide an
8 Gary Horlick & Judith Coleman, A Comment on Compliance with WTO Dispute
Settlement Decisions, in THE WTO: GOVERNANCE, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT & DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 771, 772 (Merit E. Janow et al. eds., 2008) (finding compliance rates of sixty-
seven percent for full compliance, twenty-four percent for partial compliance, and nine
percent for unabashed noncompliance); Bruce Wilson, Compliance by WTO Members with
Adverse WTO Dispute Settlement Rulings: The Record to Date, 10 J. INT'L EcON. L. 397,
398-99 (2007) (of the 109 cases where a panel or Appellate Body report was adopted, a
violation was found in nearly ninety percent of the cases; the DSB granted authorization to
retaliate in only eight cases as a result of noncompliance); see also Steve Chamovitz, The
Enforcement of WTO Judgments, 34 YALE J. INT'L L. 558, 563 (2009) (discussing
compliance record with WTO judgments); Facts and Figures on Dispute Settlement
(2010), WORLDTRADELAW.NET, http://www.worldtradelaw.net/dsc/database/basicfigures.
asp (last visited June 16, 2011). In the event a Member State remains in noncompliance, the
WTO provides remedies, including compensation and suspension of concessions, equal to
the injury caused by the Member State's failure to comply with the adverse decision. WTO
Dispute Settlement Understanding, art. 22.
9 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XXI(b), Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11,
55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT 1947].
'o GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting Held in the Centre William Rappard on May 7,
1982, C/M/157, at 12 (June 22, 1982) [hereinafter GATT Council Meeting of May 7,
1982], http://www.wto.org/gatt docs/english/sulpdfl90440042.pdf.
" See infra text accompanying notes 272-278.
12 United Nations, Econ. & Soc. Council, Preparatory Comm. of the U.N. Conference
on Trade & Emp't, Thirty-Third Meeting of Commission A, at 19, U.N. Doc.




exception . . . that would permit anything under the sun."l 3 Therefore, the
exception was drafted so it could be invoked in limited circumstances-such as
war or international emergencies-but then left to the Member States' sole
discretion when invoked in those circumstances:
I think no one would question the need of a Member, or the right of
Member, to take action relating to its security interests and to determine
for itself-which I think we cannot deny-what its security interests are
.... I'think there must be some latitude here for security measures. It is
really a question of balance. We have got to have some exceptions. We
cannot make it too tight, because we cannot prohibit measures which are
needed for purely security reasons. On the other hand, we cannot make it
so broad that, under the guise of security, countries will put on measures
which really have a commercial purpose . . . . This is the best we could
produce to preserve the proper balance.14
We can only hope, the Norwegian Chairman added, that "when the [GATT] is in
operation ... the atmosphere inside the [GATT] will be ... [an] efficient guarantee
against abuses ... "
Those hopes have been realized. Despite the risks associated with a self-
judging exception, Member States have exercised good faith in complying with
their trade obligations. In over sixty years of international trade, invocations of the
security exception have only been challenged a handful of times, and those
challenges have never resulted in a binding GATT/WTO decision. An
unaccountable sovereign domain prevails in one small corner of the trade regime,
and yet the WTO continues to thrive.
Trade restrictions in furtherance of national and international interests are
exceedingly common. The United Nations (U.N.) Charter presumes that the
Security Council will pursue the "complete or partial interruption of economic
relations" before it authorizes the use of armed force.' 6 The U.N. has embraced this
approach with gusto, leading David Cortright and George Lopez to describe the
1990s as the "Sanctions Decade."" Examining fourteen U.N. case studies,
Cortright and Lopez conclude that comprehensive trade sanctions are the most
effective of all types of sanctions, provided they are enforced so as to have the
13 Id. at 20 (Mr. Leddy on behalf of the United States).
4 Id. at 20-21.
15 Id. at 21 (Mr. Colban on behalf of Norway).
16 U.N. Charter art. 41.
" DAVID CORTRIGHT & GEORGE LOPEZ, THE SANCTIONS DECADE: ASSESSING UN
STRATEGIES IN THE 1990s (2000).
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greatest possible economic and social impact18 -objectives antithetical to the
WTO's goal of a "substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade."l9
Nations routinely restrict trade and other economic relations for security
reasons. For example, in the United States, the president is given broad authority to
regulate trade that threatens the national interest. The Export Control Act
authorizes the president, "[i]n furtherance of world peace and the security and
foreign policy of the United States . . . to control the import and the export of
defense articles and defense services." 2 0 The International Emergency Economic
Powers Act grants the president wide discretion to impose economic sanctions and
trade embargoes whenever a national emergency threatens the "national security,
foreign policy, or economy of the United States." 2 1 Foreign investment is severely
restricted under the Exon-Florio amendment to the 1988 Trade Act, which grants
the President the authority to block mergers and acquisitions which would result in
"foreign control of persons engaged in interstate commerce." 22 The Foreign
Assistance Act restricts foreign aid to countries that promote terrorism, engage in
money-laundering, or fail to punish illicit drug trafficking.23
These are just a few of the many laws and regulations that authorize or require
executive action to restrict trade in the national interest. According to a recent
study, in one ten-year period the United States imposed trade sanctions against
ninety countries, two-thirds of which were WTO members.24 The result is a
patchwork of sanctions limiting trade with friends and enemies.
18 David Cortright & George A. Lopez, Introduction: Assessing Smart Sanctions:
Lessons from the 1990s, in SMART SANCTIONS: TARGETING ECONOMIC STATECRAFT 8-9
(David Cortright & George Lopez eds., 2002).
'9 GATT 1947, supra note 9, at 3.
20 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (2006).
21 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (2006).
22 Exon-Florio Amendment to the 1988 Trade Act, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 5021, 102
Stat. 1425 (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170 (Supp. 1989)); see also Jos6 E. Alvarez,
Political Protectionism and United States International Investment Obligations in Conflict:
The Hazards ofExon-Florio, 30 VA. J. INT'L L. 1 (1989).
23 22 U.S.C. § 2291.
24 MICHAEL P. MALLOY, STUDY OF NEW U.S. UNILATERAL SANCTIONS 1997-2006, at
74-87 (2006), available at http://www.usaengage.org/storage/usaengage/Publications
/2006_studyof new_%20us unilateral_%20sanctions.pdf. The WTO countries included
in the report on U.S. unilateral sanctions are: Angola, Armenia, Bahrain, Bangladesh,
Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Burundi, Cambodia, Canada, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica,
C6te d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Gambia,
Georgia, Guatemala, Guinea Bissau, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Italy, Jamaica,
Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Maldives, Mauritania, Mexico, Moldova, Morocco,
Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia,
Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Taiwan (Chinese Taipei), Tanzania, Thailand, Tunisia, Uganda,
Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Venezuela, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe. See id.
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Absent the security exception, such actions violate core WTO rules that
guarantee most-favored-nation treatment (MFN), 2 5 national treatment, 26 and
prohibit quantitative restrictions.27 Indeed, a targeted ban on goods and services is
among the most pernicious of trade restrictions, imposing an absolute limit on
imports, distorting trade through an opaque and burdensome mechanism and
rewarding less efficient competitors from non-targeted countries.28
This Article analyzes the security exception in detail, with a particular focus
on State practice. In the absence of any GATT or WTO jurisprudence, State
practice affords the best vehicle to understand its meaning. As discussed in Part II,
in the few instances when invocation of the security exception has been
challenged, State practice suggests that the security exception is not reviewable.
If a Member State can avoid WTO obligations through a self-judging security
exception, what is to prevent bad faith invocations? As discussed in Part 111, the
WTO regime includes a number of devices to address this concern, including
opting out of normal trade relations, opting in to deeper trade relations, granting
preferential treatment to developing countries consistent with security interests,
and protecting against the nullification or impairment of Member States' legitimate
expectations even in the absence of a WTO violation. These arrangements provide
broad discretion to act in furtherance of the national interest without violating trade
rules. As such, Member States quite often can advance national objectives without
the need to invoke the security exception.
25 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 art. I, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IA, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 33
I.L.M. 1153 (1994) [hereinafter GATT 1994]. Article I of the GATT 1994 requires MFN
treatment, which in practice demands non-discrimination between products from all WTO
member states and prohibits the products from one Member State from being treated less
favorably than the products from any other Member State. Likewise, MFN treatment is
guaranteed with respect to services under Article II of the General Agreement on Trade in
Services, ensuring equal opportunity for services providers from all WTO Member States.
General Agreement on Trade in Services art. II, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1 B, Legal Instruments-Results of the
Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter GATS].
26 Article 111:4 of GATT 1994, supra note 25, requires products from Member States
to be accorded "treatment no less favorable" than that accorded to like products of national
origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements. Article XIII: I of GATT 1994,
supra note 25, addresses discriminatory quantitative restrictions, stating that "[n]o
prohibition or restriction shall be applied . . . on the importation of any product of the
territory of any other contracting party ... unless the importation of the like product of all
third countries . . . is similarly prohibited or restricted."
27 Article XI of GATT 1994, supra note 25, prohibits quotas, import bans, and similar
quantitative restrictions on the products of other Member States. Likewise, a prohibition on
services is a market access barrier that violates Article XVI of the GATS, supra note 25.
28 See Appellate Body Report, Turkey-Restrictions on Imports of Textile and




Notwithstanding these mitigating factors, a self-judging security exception
poses grave risks. If abused, it could undermine the entire WTO regime. But the
practice of WTO Member States is to invoke the security exception in good faith,
with a margin of discretion. A Member State may do so because of a fear of
sanction, out of a sense of norm legitimacy, or because it is in its self-interest to do
so. The Article concludes in Part IV with brief reflections on why nations comply
with the good faith obligation of a self-judging exception. Compliance with a self-
judging rule offers useful insights into larger questions of why nations obey
international law. Rational choice and normative theories best explain compliance
with a self-judging international norm.
With over $16 trillion in annual world trade, every nation must weigh the
economic rewards and security risks of international trade. Finding a proper
balance between free trade and national security is fundamental for international
relations to flourish. This Article explains how the WTO regime facilitates nations
achieving that balance.
II. THE WTO SECURITY EXCEPTION
The WTO security exception is unlike other exceptions in international trade
law, establishing a domain of trade relations beyond WTO judicial review. In
adopting these exceptions, the WTO recognized certain trading behavior as the
international equivalent of a political question, in which a nation is "invested with
certain political powers, in the exercise of which [it] is to use [its] own discretion
. . . ; and whatever opinion may be entertained of the manner in which [such]
discretion may be used, still there exists, and can exist, no power to control that
discretion."29 In the international context this is described as the doctrine of self-
judging: whether factual circumstances satisfy the requirements of the security
exception is left to the sound discretion of the Member State invoking the
exception. As the summary report of the Geneva Draft stated in 1947, under the
security exception "Members may ... do whatever they think necessary to protect
their security interests relating to atomic materials, arms traffic, and wartime or
,,30
other international emergencies ."3
Article XXI provides that:
29 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 165-66 (1803).
30 U.N. Conference on Trade and Employment, Havana, Cuba, Nov. 21, 1947-Mar.
24, 1948, An Informal Summary of the ITO Charter, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.2/INF.8 at 35
(Nov. 21, 1947), available at http://www.wto.org/gatt-docs/English/SULPDF/9018
0098.pdf; see also Summary Record of the Twenty-Second Meeting, Request of the
Government of Czechoslovakia for a Decision Under Article XXIII, at 7,
GATT/CP.3/SR.22 (June 8, 1949) (citing statement from Mr. Shackle of the United




Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed
(a) to require any contracting party to furnish any information the
disclosure of which it considers contrary to its essential security interests;
or
(b) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action which it
considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests
(i) relating to fissionable materials or the materials from which they
are derived;
(ii) relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of
war and to such traffic in other goods and materials as is carried on
directly or indirectly for the purpose of supplying a military
establishment;
(iii) taken in time of war or other emergency in international
relations; or
(c) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action in pursuance
of its obligations under the United Nations Charter for the maintenance
of international peace and security.
While there is no dispute that the security exception is generally beyond WTO
review, as discussed below, the scope of Member State discretion is contested. The
security exception embraces five broad categories: (1) national security
information;32 (2) nuclear material; 3 3 (3) military goods and services; 34 (4) war and
international emergencies;35 and (5) U.N. Charter obligations.3 6 Only one of these
31 GATT 1994, supra note 25, art. XXI.
32 Id. art. XXI(a); see also GATS, supra note 25, art. XIV(a) ("Nothing in this
Agreement shall be construed (a) to require any Member to furnish any information, the
disclosure of which it considers contrary to its essential security interests.").
3 GATS, supra note 25, art. XXI(b)(i); see also id. art. XIV(b)(ii) ("Nothing in this
Agreement shall be construed ... (b) to prevent any Member from taking any action which
it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests: . .. (ii) relating to
fissionable and fusionable materials or the materials from which they are derived. . . .").
34 Id. art. XXI(b)(ii); see also id. art. XIV(b)(i) ("Nothing in this Agreement shall be
construed . . . (b) to prevent any Member from taking any action which it considers
necessary for the protection of its essential security interests: (i) relating to the supply of
services as carried out directly or indirectly for the purpose of provisioning a military
establishment.").
s Id. art. XXI(b)(iii); see also id. art. XIV(b)(iii) ("Nothing in this Agreement shall be
construed . . . (b) to prevent any Member from taking any action which it considers
necessary for the protection of its essential security interests: (iii) taken in time of war or
other emergency in international relations.").
36 Id. art. XXI(c); see also id. art. XIV(c) ("Nothing in this Agreement shall be
construed . . . (c) to prevent any Member from taking any action in pursuance of its




exceptions-relating to Member State action taken pursuant to U.N. Charter
obligations-adopts an objective standard.37 The other four are self-judging: it is
sufficient to trigger the exception that a Member State considers the action
necessary to further its essential security interests.
A. Possible Interpretations
The degree to which these exceptions are self-judging is an open question.
According to one interpretation, a Member State can decide for itself whether a
measure is essential to its security interests and relates to one of the enumerated
conditions. 38 Another interpretation would recognize a Member State's prerogative
to determine for itself whether a security exception is applicable, but would impose
a good faith standard that is subject to judicial review. Under a third interpretation,
a Member State can decide for itself whether "it considers" a measure to be
"necessary for the protection of its essential security interests," but the enumerated
conditions are subject to judicial review.39
To illustrate these interpretations in action, in November 1975 Sweden
introduced a global import quota on certain footwear, arguing that the sharp
decline in domestic production "had become a critical threat to the emergency
planning of Sweden's economic defense as an integral part of its security policy."40
Other Member States expressed doubts as to the justification, but no GATT panel
decision was ever established to challenge the measure. 41 Under all three
interpretations, combat boots would satisfy the requirements of Article XXI(b)(ii)
as goods used to outfit the military. The same could not be said of, say, slippers.42
Under the first theory, the choice of which products to restrict under Article XXI is
solely left to the Member State. Under the second approach, the WTO review
would be limited to an examination of whether the trading restriction on footwear
was taken in good faith.43 Under the third approach, the WTO would be free to
scrutinize whether a particular boot, in fact, constituted a military product.
3 This Article does not address Article XXI(c) further. The discussion of self-judging
should not be interpreted as applying to this part of Article XXI.
3 Id. art. XXI(b)(ii).
'9 Id. art XIV(1)(b)(iii) (An enumerated condition is, is for example, whether a
measure "relat[es] to ... an implement of war" or was "taken in time of war or other
emergency.").
40 Council of Representatives, Report on Work Since the Thirtieth Session, at 17-18,
L/4254 (Nov. 25, 1975) [hereinafter Report on Work]; Sweden-Import Restrictions on
Certain Footwear, at 3, L/4250 (Nov. 17, 1975) [hereinafter Sweden-Import Restrictions].
41 Report on Work, supra note 40, at 18; Minutes of Meeting, at 8-9, GATT Doc.
C/M1109 (Oct. 31, 1975).
42 The tariff classification on the global import included "footwear with outer soles of
rubber or plastic material and with uppers of plastic material, other than slippers."
Sweden-Import Restrictions, supra note 40, at 2.
43 The WTO could, for example, use an objective standard such as the Control List of
the Wassenaar Arrangement to identify civilian goods that also serve a military purpose.
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Few scholars have analyzed the security exception, and those who have are
sharply divided as to the appropriate interpretation. Those who take a textual,
historical, or prudential viewpoint favor a self-judging approach. Raj Bhala, for
example, concludes that "the implication of the word 'it' indicates that no WTO
Member, nor group of Members, and no WTO panel or other adjudicatory body,
has any right to determine whether a measure taken by a sanctioning member
satisfies the requirements."4 Others point to the longstanding and unified practice
45of the major powers in asserting exclusive competency over security measures,
and prudential considerations similar to those raised in Baker v. Carr4 6 to argue
that the security exception is self-judging. 4 7 Any other conclusion would subject
national security decisions to international judicial review and graft an Article XX
chapeau onto Article XXI, forcing nations to establish that they did not take
national security measures as a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
or a disguised restriction on trade.
Those who oppose a self-judging rule argue, at a minimum, for a good faith
standard.48 Some scholars support this approach based on the context of the Article
See Wassennaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use
Goods and Technologies (Dec. 2009), http:J/www.wassenaar.org/guidelines/docs/
Guidelines%20and%20procedures%20including%20the%201E%20-%202009.pdf. Target
countries have, on occasion, challenged the scope of military goods subject to export
controls. See infra text accompanying notes 59-74.
44 Raj Bhala, National Security and International Trade Law: What the GA TT Says,
and What the United States Does, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L EcoN. L. 263, 268-69 (1998); see also
Andrew Emmerson, Conceptualizing Security Exceptions: Legal Doctrine or Political
Excuse, 11 J. INT'L EcON. L. 135, 142-43 (2010); Richard Sutherland Whitt, The Politics
of Procedure: An Examination of the GATT Dispute Settlement Panel and Article XX1
Defense in the Context of the US. Embargo of Nicaragua, 19 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus.
603, 616 (1987).
45 Wesley A. Cann, Jr., Creating Standards and Accountability for the Use of the
WTO Security Exception: Reducing the Role of Power-Based Relations and Establishing a
New Balance Between Sovereignty and Multilateralism, 26 YALE J. INT'L L. 413, 430
(2001) ("[T]he United States, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Australia, and the European
Union have been unified in their belief that political, foreign policy, and national security
issues are beyond the auspices of the agreement and that the GATT has no power,
competence, or experience to resolve such disputes.").
46 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
47 Michael J. Hahn, Vital Interests and the Law of GATT: An Analysis of GATT's
Security Exception, 12 MICH. J. INT'LL. 558, 612-14 (1991); Peter Lindsay, The Ambiguity
of GATT Article XI: Subtle Success or Rampant Failure, 52 DUKE L.J. 1277, 1296-1300
(2003); C. Todd Piczak, The Helms-Burton Act: U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Cuba, The
National Security Exception to the GA TT and the Political Question Doctrine, 61 U. PITT.
L. REV. 287, 318-24 (1999).
48 See, e.g., Dapo Akande & Sope Williams, International Adjudication on National
Security Issues: What Role for the WTO?, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 365, 390-96 (2003); Susan
Rose-Ackerman & Benjamin Billa, Treaties and National Security, 40 INT'L L. & PoL.
437, 467 (2008); Cann, supra note 45, at 479-80; Hannes L. Schloemann & Stefan
2011] 705
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XXI within the GATT framework. 4 9 "[N]ot just any noneconomic political or
military motive can satisfy the condition of essentiality . . . . The test for
proportionality, here as in other areas of the law, is the reasonableness of the
measure in the context."5 o Other scholars focus on international tribunal
interpretations of similar treaties, and the need to develop a norm of
accountability in an age of global interdependence. 52
Some approaches go further still and contend that the security exception has
both objective and subjective elements. On this reading, whether a measure is
necessary to protect essential security interests is a self-judging question, but the
remaining provisions of Article XXI are subject to an objective standard of
review.5 3 These scholars, such as Dapo Akande and Sope Williams, adopt a
purposive approach that balances the competing interests of protecting national
sovereignty and maintaining stability in the international trading regime. "[S]ince
Article XXI was intended to create a legal obligation, it must be interpreted in a
way that the final decision does not rest with the party invoking national
security." 54
B. State Practice
One of the reasons for the diverging views on the security exception is that
the traditional means of treaty interpretation do not provide much clarity.5 The
"ordinary meaning" of the phrase "it considers" requires at least some of the
exception to be self-judging, but it is not clear whether those words modify all or
part of Article XXI(b). The "object and purpose" of the entire treaty is trade
liberalization, but the "object and purpose" of the exception is to protect security
interests. A focus on the purpose requires a balancing of competing goals, but it
does not answer who should strike that balance, or how it should be struck. The
obligation to interpret a treaty in "good faith" presents the same problem. No one
Ohlhoff, "Constitutionalization" and Dispute Settlement in the WTO: National Security as
an Issue of Competence, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 424, 446 (1999).
49 Schloemann & Ohlhoff, supra note 48, at 443-45.
'old. at 444-45.
5' Akande & Williams, supra note 48, at 393-94.
52 Cann, supra note 45, at 479.
s3 See, e.g., Akande & Williams, supra note 48, at 399-400; Hahn, supra note 47, at
587-91.
54 Akande & Williams, supra note 48, at 383.
5 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 31-32, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
56 For example, does "it considers" modify "necessary for the protection of its
essential security interests" only, or does it also modify "taken in time of war or other
emergency in international relations"? One interpretation would leave to the Member State
a determination as to whether an emergency existed, while the other interpretation would
not.
5 See supra text accompanying notes 30-37.
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disputes that nations should invoke in good faith, but who is to judge whether that
has occurred: the Member State or the institution? Finally, as for context, the most
significant textual context is the Article XX general exceptions, 58 which are not
self-judging and have been the subject of significant WTO litigation.59 But this
textual comparison provides an answer that is obvious and unhelpful: unlike
Article XX, the security exception is either partially or totally self-judging.
Exacerbating the problem is the absence of any authoritative pronouncement
as to the meaning of the security exception. Prior to the establishment of the WTO
in 1995, Member States could block the creation of GATT panels, limit their terms
of reference, and veto adverse panel decisions, effectively foreclosing judicial
review.60 There have been a small handful of disputes addressing Article XXI, 61
but no binding GATT or WTO panel decision has ever interpreted the security
exception. Surprisingly, the most important judicial pronouncement has come from
the ICJ, which has distinguished the self-judging language in Article XXI from
non-self-judging language in other treaties.62 Such an interpretation offers
significant persuasive authority for a self-judging interpretation of the WTO
national security exception.
In the absence of authoritative judicial pronouncements, and without greater
clarity from other traditional tools of treaty interpretation, this Article argues that
sixty years of State practice goes far toward understanding the meaning of the
security exception. Reliance on State practice is a common tool of treaty
interpretation. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties requires Member
States to take into account "subsequent practice in the application of the treaty
which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation." 6 3
Moreover, State practice is given heightened importance in the WTO, with Article
XVI of the WTO Agreement stipulating that "the WTO shall be guided by the
decisions, procedures and customary practices followed by the CONTRACTING
58 GATT 1994, supra note 25, art. XX ("Subject to the requirement that such
measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a
disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to
prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures . . . (a) necessary
to protect public morals; (b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; ...
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources . . .
59 See infra text accompanying notes 70-190.
60 See Judith L. Goldstein & Richard H. Steinberg, Negotiate or Litigate? Effects of
WTO Judicial Delegation on Domestic Trade Politics 12 (The Law and Politics of
International Delegation, Workshop, 2007), available at http://www.law.duke.edu/cicl/pdf/
dsworkshop/goldstein.pdf.
61 WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, GUIDE TO GATT LAW AND PRACTICE:
ANALYTICAL INDEX 600-05 (1994), available at www.wto.org/english/rese/booksp e
/gatt ai e/art21_e.doc.
62 See infra text accompanying notes 280-289.
63 Vienna Convention, supra note 55, art. 3 1(3)(b).
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PARTIES to GATT 1947. ... The lex generalis of treaty interpretation and the
lex specialis of WTO law require reliance on State practice in interpreting treaty
provisions.
A final reason to analyze State practice is that, regardless of whether a future
WTO panel may interpret the security exception as self-judging, for the past sixty
years it has been self-judging. As such, State practice sheds the best possible light
on the scope and meaning of the security exception. It also helps answer broader
questions as to why States obey a self-judging rule of international law.
A review of the State practice outlined below leads to several conclusions. All
States agree that the security exception can only be invoked in good faith and a
strong majority of the States maintain that the security exception is self-judging. 6 5
States interpreting the exception as self-judging are concerned with the need to
effectively protect their security interests and to subordinate trade commitments to
those interests.6 6 They are also concerned about institutional competency and
politicizing the WTO.6 7 The minority of States that oppose a self-judging
interpretation express concerns about abuse of the security exception by
economically powerful States.68
1. The Marshall Plan
In March 1948, the U.S. Congress approved spending billions of dollars to
save Western Europe from imminent economic collapse.6 9 With total outlays of
over $13 billion, the Marshall Plan was a desperate attempt to keep Western
Europe from the fate suffered by countries behind the Iron Curtain.7 0 As part of the
64 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization art. XVI(1), Apr.
15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter WTO Agreement].
65 GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting Held in the Centre William Rappard on May
29, 1985, C/M/188 (June 28, 1985), http://www.wto.org/gattdocs/English/SULPDF
/91150029.pdf.
66 See infra Part I.
67See infra Part I; see also Michael Freund, Israel Not Bringing Arab Boycott to WTO,
JERUSALEM POST, May 5, 2006.
68 See infra text accompanying notes 117-118.
69 GREG BEHRMAN, THE MOST NOBLE ADVENTURE: THE MARSHALL PLAN AND THE
TIME WHEN AMERICA HELPED SAVE EUROPE 141-66 (2007).
70 In a national radio address, Secretary of State George Marshall outlined the
importance of European recovery in stark terms. The choice was between government
tyranny in the Soviet bloc and European unification in the west: "[t]he issue is really clear-
cut .... [T]he Soviet Union ... openly predict[s] that this restoration will not take place.
We . . . are confident in the rehabilitation of Western European civilization . . . . The
situation must be stabilized." The Nation: Cold & Clear, TIME (Dec. 29, 1947),
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,804378,00.html. American support was
essential to "preserve all that has been gained in the past centuries by these nations and all
that their cooperation promises for the future." Text of Marshall Radio Report on Big 4
Parley, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1947, at 4. In testimony before Congress advocating the
passage of the aid package, Marshall underscored that if the United States decided that it
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Marshall Plan, the United States established an export control program. Shipments
of products in short supply or of military significance were licensed freely to
sixteen participating countries in Western Europe, but were carefully controlled if
exported to Eastern Europe.7' The disparate treatment of the.export control regime
was established in order "l) to ensure an adequate flow to participating countries
of goods needed for their economic recovery and 2) to prevent the shipment to
Eastern Europe of things that would contribute significantly to the military
potential of that region."72
Czechoslovakia originally accepted the invitation to participate in the
Marshall Plan, but pressure from the Soviet Union ultimately forced it to decline.73
So instead Czechoslovakia challenged the Marshall Plan as a violation of MFN. In
1949, Czechoslovakia filed a complaint before the GATT alleging that the export
control regime violated its trading rights. It argued that Article XXI should be
interpreted narrowly, otherwise "practically everything may be a possible element
of war," an interpretation that would "change the face of civilization" and stretch
the war power "until it covers the whole nation." 74
In response, the United States argued that it was entirely within its rights
under Article XXI to restrict exports to Eastern Europe and that "most of the
"is unable or unwilling . .. to assist in the reconstruction of western Europe we must accept
the consequences of its collapse into the dictatorship of police states." Marshall's
Testimony in Support of ERP Before Senate Committee Hearing, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1948,
at 4.
71 Statement by the Head of the Czechoslovak Delegation Mr. Zdenk Augenthaler to
Item 14 of Agenda, Request of the Government of Czechoslovakia for a Decision Under
Article XXHII as to Whether or Not the Government of the United States of America Has
Failed to Carry Out Its Obligations Under the Agreement Through Its Administration of
the Issue of Export Licenses, at 5, 12, CP.3/33 (May 30, 1949) [hereinafter Statement by
the Head of Czechoslovak Delegation] (quoting Willard L. Thorp for the United States),
available at http://www.wto.org/gatt-docs/English/SULPDF/90320183.pdf.
72 id.
7 See MICHAEL BRECHER & JONATHAN WILKENFELD, A STUDY OF CRISIS 339-41
(1997); Andrea Komlosy, The Marshall Plan and the Making of the "Iron Curtain" in
Austria, in THE MARSHALL PLAN IN AUSTRIA 98, 111-12 (Gtinter Bischof, & Anton
Pelinka eds., 2000).
74 Statement by the Head of the Czechoslovak Delegation, supra note 71, at 6 (Under
the United States' broad interpretation, "[w]ar power stretches away from the actual
[military] organizations until it covers . . . 'the young mother, peacefully feeding her tender
baby at her breast, [who] is transfigured from an idyllic picture of motherhood into a grim
amazon, pouring sinews of war into a recruit ready to take up a rifle on the twentieth year
of hostilities."'). Among the products allegedly subject to control were equipment for dried
milk production, electric bulb wire, electrodes, X-ray tubes, enameled copper wire, and
mining equipment. Id. at 8. But see Reply by the Vice Chairman of the U.S. Delegation,
Mr. John W. Evans, to the Speech by the Head of the Czechoslovak Delegation Under Item
14 on the Agenda, at 10, CP.3/38 (June 2, 1949) [hereinafter Statement of U.S.
Delegation], available at http://sul-derivatives.stanford.edu/derivative?CSNID=9032




delegates present will feel greater security for their own future because the United
States is, in fact, making use of these exceptions."7 The United States defended
the application of export controls for goods which appeared to be intended for
peaceful use, but which in fact had military applications.76
At the GATT Council meeting of June 8, 1949, Czechoslovakia requested a
decision on "whether the . . . United States had failed to carry out its obligations
under the Agreement through its administration of . .. export licenses."n With the
exception of Czechoslovakia, the members unanimously voted against referring the
matter to a Panel for decision.78 The British delegate summarized the delicate
balance struck any time a Member State invokes Article XXI:
[S]ince the question clearly concerned Article XXI, the United States
action would seem to be justified because every country must have the
last resort on questions relating to its own security. On the other hand,
the Contracting Parties should be cautious not to take any step which
might have the effect of undermining the General Agreement.79
It would be over thirty years before the GATT Council debated the security
exception again.
2. The Falkland War
On April 2, 1982, Argentine forces occupied the Falkland Islands, defending
the occupation as an effort to regain islands "that legitimately form part of our
national patrimony-safeguarding the national honor."80 The following day the
U.N. Security Council passed a resolution demanding "an immediate withdrawal
of all Argentine forces from the Falkland Islands ....
On May 7, 1982, the European Community, together with Australia and
Canada, established a trade embargo, the "most sweeping [economic sanctions]
7 Statement of U.S. Delegation, supra note 74, at 4.
76 For example, export licenses for ball bearings were denied because the
specifications showed they were designed for use in military aircraft or other military
applications. The request for mining drills was rejected because the drills were not
designed to extract coal, but rather for the deep underground exploration of uranium
mineral deposits extracted for use in nuclear weapons. Id. at 10-11.
n GATT Council, Summary Record of the Twenty-Second Meeting, at 9, CP.3/SR.22
(June 8, 1949), available at http://www.wto.org/gatt docs/English/SULPDF/90060100.pdf.
78 The vote was seventeen in the negative, three abstentions, and one affirmative vote.
Id.
' Id. at 7-8.
8o Argentina Seizes Falkland Islands; British Ships Move, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1982,
at 1.




that the community had ever imposed." 82 The British prime minister Margaret
Thatcher described the embargo as "a very important step, unprecedented in its
scope."83
Argentina was one of the most indebted countries in the world,84 and
economic pressure posed a serious threat. Annual exports to the European
Economic Community (EEC) alone were valued at $2.3 billion, and "[w]ithout
these revenues it would have been difficult for Argentina, which had reserves of
approximately $5 billion, to pay the nearly $10 billion in annual interest and other
charges on its foreign debt."8 5
Argentina alleged that the trade embargo could not be justified under Article
XXI, particularly given that its territorial dispute was with only one country, the
United Kingdom.86 On May 7, 1982, the GATT Council met to address the
dispute, with delegates from thirty-seven countries expressing an opinion on the
matter. Twenty countries described the trade embargo as falling within the inherent
right of Member States and beyond GATT's competence.8 7 Six countries argued
that the embargo was subject to GATT review,88 and eleven countries lamented the
crisis but did not address GATT's authority to review it.89 Thus, an overwhelming
majority of the Member States believed that trade sanctions fell within a country's
inherent rights and that Article XXI was self-judging.
The arguments for and against self-judging were illuminating. The European
Community, on behalf of its ten Member States, argued that it was their "inherent
right" to take action under Article XXI, and the "exercise of these rights . . .
required neither notification, [nor] justification, nor approval, a procedure
82 Communication by the Commission of the European Communities, Trade
Restrictions Affecting Argentina Applied for Non-Economic Reasons, at 1, L/5319 (May
18, 1982), available at http://www.wto.org/gatt docs/English/SULPDF/90990462.pdf;
GATT Council Meeting, supra note 10, at 10; Paul Lewis, E.E.C. to Embargo Argentine
Imports, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1982, at D19.
83 Excerpts From Mrs. Thatcher's Talk, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1982, at A14.
84 Edward Schumacher, The Squeeze on Argentina, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1982, at Dl.
85 DANIEL K. GIBRAN, THE FALKLANDS WAR: BRITAIN VERSUS THE PAST IN SOUTH
AMERICA 92 (1998).
86 Communication by Argentina, Trade Restrictions Affecting Argentina Applied for
Non-Economic Reasons, at 2, L/5317 (Apr. 30, 1982), available at http://www.wto.
org/gatt docs/English/SULPDF/90990459.pdf; GATT Council Meeting, supra note 10, at
2-4.
87 The countries were Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, Hungary, Japan, New Zealand,
Norway, the Philippines, Singapore, the United States, and the ten countries of the
European Communities (Belgium, Denmark, France, West Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, and the United Kingdom). See GATT Council Meeting, supra
note 10, at 7-11.
88 These countries were Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, Pakistan, Poland, and Uruguay. See
id. at 2-9.
89 These countries were Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador,
India, Indonesia, Peru, Romania, Spain, Yugoslavia, and Zaire. See id. at 4-9.
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confirmed by thirty-five years of implementation of the General Agreement." 90
The United States agreed, stating that:
GATT, by its own terms, left it to each contracting party to judge what
was necessary to protect its essential security interests in time of
international crisis. This was wise ... since no country could participate
in GATT if in doing so it gave up the possibility of using any measures,
other than military, to protect its security interests. . . . [F]orcing the
GATT ... to play a role for which it was never intended, could seriously
undermine its utility, benefit and promise for all contracting parties.91
Japan echoed this concern, stating that "the interjection of political elements into
GATT activities would not facilitate the carrying out of its entrusted tasks" and
that "one of the most important contributing factors for the effective and efficient
functioning of the GATT was that contracting parties had developed a working
habit of dealing with trade affairs in a businesslike manner."92
On the other hand, the risk of an unbounded. security exception was obvious
to many Member States. From such arguments, Argentina responded, "[i]t would
appear that trade restrictions could be adopted without having to be justified or
approved and . . . explained, anyone could now have recourse to that magnificent
safeguard clause." 93 Brazil likewise found it "difficult . . . to accept that the
countries in question, except [the United Kingdom], were taking this action in
protection of their essential security interests." The embargo against Argentina
"could set a dangerous precedent if the measures . .. were considered necessary for
the protection of essential security interests . . . [when] such interests had not been
demonstrated." 94
No GATT panel was formed to review the embargo against Argentina. The
GATT Council did, however, render a decision encouraging greater transparency
when Member States invoke Article XXI. The Council recognized that trade
measures taken for security reasons "could constitute, in certain circumstances, an
element of disruption and uncertainty for international trade." 95 Nonetheless, the
security exception "constitute[s] an important element for safeguarding the rights
of contracting parties when they consider that reasons of security are involved." 96
9o Id. at 10.
91 Id. at 8.
92 Id. at 9.
93 Id. at 12.
94 Id. at 5.
05 GATT Council, Decision Concerning Article XXI of the General Agreement,




3. The Reagan Doctrine
In his State of the Union address on February 6, 1985, President Ronald
Reagan proclaimed that "[w]e cannot play innocents abroad in a world that's not
innocent; nor can we be passive when freedom is under siege. . . . Support for
freedom fighters is self-defense . . . . It is essential that the Congress continue all
facets of our assistance to Central America." 97 A prominent commentator dubbed it
the "Reagan Doctrine," demanding "overt and unashamed American support for
anti-Communist revolutions."98
One facet of this policy was economic isolation. On May 1, 1985, President
Reagan issued Executive Order 12,513, concluding that "an unusual and
extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy" existed and that the
United States was imposing a trade embargo on Nicaragua prohibiting all imports
and exports of goods and services to and from Nicaragua.99 The trade sanctions
halted an estimated $169 million in bilateral trade.100
On May 6, 1985, Nicaragua requested a special meeting of the GATT Council
to examine the trade embargo.10' The GATT Council met on May 29, 1985, and as
before, an overwhelming majority of States affirmed the inherent right of a
Member State to protect its essential security interests.10 2 Of the forty-three nations
addressing the Council, nineteen argued that Article XXI was self-judging;'o3 nine
argued that it was not;104 and fifteen expressed no opinion on the matter.'0o Again,
9 Ronald Reagan, President of the U.S., State of the Union Address (Feb. 6, 1985),
available at http://millercenter.org/scripps/archive/speeches/detail/5681.
98 Charles Krauthammer, Essay: The Reagan Doctrine, TIME (Apr. 1, 1985),
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,964873,00.html; see also JAMES M.
SCOTT, DECIDING TO INTERVENE: THE REAGAN DOCTRINE AND AMERICAN FOREIGN
POLICY 14-39 (1996).
99 Exec. Order No. 12,513, 3 C.F.R. 342 (1985).
100 Shirley Christian, Reagan Reported Planning Nicaragua Trade Embargo,
Retaining Diplomatic Links; Decision Imminent, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 1985, at Al.
101 Communication from Nicaragua, United States-Trade Measures Affecting
Nicaragua, at 1, L/5802 (May 8, 1985), available at http://www.wto.org/gatt-docs/
English/SULPDF/91130209.pdf.
102 GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting Held in the Centre William Rappard on May
29, 1985, at 1-17, C/M/188 (June 28, 1985), available at http://www.wto.org/gatt_
docs/English/SULPDF/91150029.pdf.
103 These countries were Australia, Canada, Iceland, Japan, Norway, Portugal,
Sweden, Switzerland, the United States, and the ten countries of the European Economic
Community (Belgium, Denmark, France, West Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, and the United Kingdom). See id at 4, 10-17.
104 These countries were Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, India,
Nicaragua, Peru, and Spain. See id at 2-11.
105 These countries were Austria, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic,
Egypt, Finland, Hungary, Jamaica, Mexico, Poland, Romania, Trinidad and Tobago,
Uruguay, and Yugoslavia. See id. at 7-15.
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as with the Falkland crisis, an overwhelming majority of Member States found the
security exception to be self-judging.
The United States argued that GATT was the wrong forum to address national
security questions. "It was not for GATT to approve or disapprove the judgment
made by the United States as to what was necessary to protect its national security
interests; GATT was a trade organization, and had no competence to judge such
matters." 0 6 The United States argued further that "GATT's effectiveness in
addressing trade issues would only be weakened if it became a forum for debating
political and security issues."' 0 7 Japan concurred, stressing that "it was essential to
separate trade issues from political factors" if the GATT was to function
effectively. 0 8
Given the nature of the dispute, several delegates doubted GATT's
institutional competence. Australia argued that the U.N. Security Council, not
GATT, was the appropriate international forum for addressing this issue.109 Canada
likewise viewed the conflict between the United States and Nicaragua as one that
"was fundamentally not a trade issue, but one which could only be resolved in a
context broader than GATT.""o
The European Community underlined the longstanding tradition of leaving
security questions out of GATT, stating that:
GATT had never had the role of settling disputes essentially linked to
security. Such disputes had only rarely, and for good reason, been
examined in the context of the General Agreement, which had neither the
authority nor the competence to settle matters of this type . . . . In their
wisdom, the authors of the General Agreement . . . left to each
contracting party the task of judging what was necessary to protect its
essential security interests.I''
Numerous countries doubted the need for sanctions against Nicaragua,
including those that otherwise supported the U.S. position. Sweden agreed that it
was up to "each country to define its essential security interests," but lamented that
"[i]n this particular case, . . . the United States had not shown the necessary
prudence [and] had chosen to give a too far-reaching interpretation to Article
xxi 112 '
Those favoring GATT review focused on the threat of unreasonable and
arbitrary invocations of Article XXI by the major powers. "It was absurd to
suggest that Nicaragua, a small and underdeveloped country, could pose a threat to
the national security of one of the most powerful countries in the world," argued
106 Id. at 5.
1
0 7 id.
'os Id. at 14.
19 Id. at 12.
"o Id.
...Id. at 13.
112 Id. at 10.
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Nicaragua." 3 "[T]here must be some correspondence between the measures
adopted and the situation giving rise to their adoption."ll 4 India reasoned that the
country imposing sanctions must "demonstrate a genuine nexus between its
security interests and the trade action taken," a nexus the United States had not
been able to establish."' 5 Cuba agreed, stating that "[i]t was a mockery . . . for such
a powerful country to cite Article XXI as a basis for imposing economic sanctions
on a small, poor country that could not possibly threaten U.S. security."ll 6
Poland underscored that Article XXI was a provision that only powerful
countries could invoke, and that smaller countries-"handicapped by their inferior
economic and trading potential"-were harmed disproportionately by such
"discriminatory, unilateral and arbitrary actions."" 7 Czechoslovakia feared that the
U.S. action would set a precedent, such that:
any contracting party wanting to justify introduction of certain trade
measures against any other contracting party could simply refer to
Article XXI and declare that its security was threatened. . . . If such
unilateral, arbitrary actions were not opposed, any small contracting
party could find itself in the same situation as Nicaragua." 8
After months of negotiations, the United States acquiesced in the formation of
a GATT panel, provided "it was understood that the Panel could not examine or
judge the validity of or motivation for the invocation of Article XXI:(b)(3) by the
United States in this matter."' Subsequently, the United States blocked the
adoption of the Panel report.12 0 Thus, the GATT Panel's decision was not binding,
and at best offered persuasive authority as to the meaning of a provision it was
expressly prohibited from reviewing.
The Panel recognized its limited mandate and refused to examine the validity
of the trade sanctions under the security exception.121 It did, nonetheless, offer
certain reflections as to the meaning of Article XXI. The Panel observed that trade
embargos "ran counter to basic aims of the GATT, namely to foster non-
discriminatory and open trade policies, to further the development of the less-
' 3 Id. at 3.
114 Id. at 16.
.. Id. at 11.
'6 Id. at 5.
"Id. at 8.
"Id. at 10.
"l9 GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting Held in the Centre William Rappard on Oct.
10, 1985, at 6, C/M/192 (Oct. 24, 1985), available at http://www.wto.org/gatt-docs/
English/SULPDF/91170093.pdf
120 See id. at 11.
121 Panel Report, United States-Trade Measures Affecting Nicaragua, % 5.1-5.17,




developed contracting parties and to reduce uncertainty in trade relations."l 2 2
Having said that, the Panel recognized that the GATT "protected each contracting
party's essential security interests through Article XXI" and that it's "purpose was
therefore not to make contracting parties forego their essential security interests for
the sake of these aims."1 23 It was therefore incumbent on "each contracting party,
whenever it made use of its rights under Article XXI, [to] carefully weigh[] its
,, 124
security needs against the need to maintain stable trade relations.
After conceding that the invocation of the security exception was a Member
State's right, the Panel expressed concerns regarding any interpretation of Article
XXI that foreclosed all judicial review.
If it were accepted that the interpretation of Article XXI was reserved
entirely to the contracting party invoking it, how could the [Member
States] ensure that this general exception to all obligations under the
General Agreement is not invoked excessively or for purposes other than
those set out in this provision?l 25
Such concerns, the Panel concluded, required "further consideration" by Member
States in a future "formal interpretation of Article XXI."l 2 6
4. War in Yugoslavia
On June 25, 1991, the republics of Slovenia and Croatia declared
independence from Yugoslavia.12 7 The ensuing war engulfed Yugoslavia for the
next decade, culminating in the NATO campaign in 1999.128 The European
response to the crisis was to slowly ratchet up pressure on Yugoslavia.' 29 The
initial response was to broker peace talks.13 0 After months of failed negotiations,






127 JOSEPH ROTHSCHILD & NANCY M. WINGFIELD, RETURN TO DIVERISTY: A
POLITICAL HISTORY OF EAST CENTRAL EUROPE SINCE WORLD WAR II 262 (3d ed. 2000),
available at http://digital.library.upenn.edu/ebooks-public/pdfs/0 195119924.pdf
128 See LAWRENCE KAPLAN, NATO AND THE UN: A PECULIAR RELATIONSHIP 133-85
(2010); RICHARD HENRY ULLMAN, THE WORLD AND YUGOSLAVIA'S WARS (1996).
129 WILLIAM ZARTMAN, PEACEMAKING IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT: METHODS AND
TECHNIQUES, 385-414 (2007); CAROLE ROGEL, THE BREAKUP OF YUGOSLAVIA AND ITS
AFTERMATH, 55-102 (2004).
130 WILLIAM DURCH, TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY PEACE OPERATIONS 55 (2006);
ZARTMAN, supra note 129, at 411.
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affecting over two-thirds of all Yugoslav trade, totaling over $34 billion.'3 1
It then pursued multilateral sanctions. The United States joined the European
Community, banning imports of all Yugoslav goods, valued at $776 million
annually. 132 On May 30, 1992, the United Nations Security Council passed
Security Resolution 757, obligating all U.N. member States to ban import and
export trade with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia Montenegro).133 In
subsequent years, the European Community expanded its sanctions to include an
oil embargo, an arms embargo, visa restrictions, a flight ban, an investment ban,
and financial sanctions.134
On November 16, 1991, Yugoslavia presented to the GATT Council the issue
of the European Community's trade sanctions, stating that it "is of crucial
importance that the Contracting Parties re-evaluate the problem of punitive trade
measures taken for non-economic reasons." 35 At least initially, Yugoslavia did not
claim that the measures violated "the relevant GATT provisions, taking into
account that [they] . . . could be justified under Article XXI."l 3 6
The European Community defended the sanctions as taken pursuant to its
"essential security interests and based on GATT Article XXI." 3 7 In an
impassioned defense of its actions, the European Community stated:
The response of the Community and its member States to violence,
intolerance and irrationality is a peaceful one: recourse to trade measures
based on Article XXI . . . . It is hoped that these peaceful measures will
act as a deterrent . . . . [E]ven if they do not have a direct impact on the
battlefield, at least they will have an effect on people's hearts and
common-sense. 38
131 Communication from Yugoslavia, Trade Measures Against Yugoslavia for Non-
Economic Reasons, at 2, L/6945 (Nov. 26, 1991) [hereinafter Trade Measures Against
Yugoslavia], available at http://www.wto.org/gatt docs/English/SULPDF/91600027.pdf.
132 David Binder, U.S. Suspends Trade Benefits to All 6 Yugoslav Republics, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 7, 1991, at 1.
1 S.C. Res. 757, T 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/757 (May 30, 1992).
134 Anthonius W. de Vries, European Sanctions Against the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia from 1998 to 2000: A Special Exercise in Targeting, in SMART SANCTIONS:
TARGETING ECONOMIC STATECRAFT 87, 91-99 (David Cortright & George Lopez eds.,
2002).
135 Trade Measures Against Yugoslavia, supra note 131, at 3.
136 Id. at 2. Subsequently, Yugoslavia argued that the subsidies could not be justified
under Article XXI. Recourse to Article XXIII:2 by Yugoslavia, EEC-Trade Measures
Taken for Non-Economic Reasons, at 2, DS27/2 (Feb. 10, 1992), available at
http://www.wto.org/gatt docs/English/SULPDF/91600334.pdf.
137 Communication from the European Communities, Trade Measures Taken by the
European Community Against the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, at 1, L/6948
(Dec. 2, 1991), available at http://www.wto.org/gatt docs/English/SULPDF/91600060.pdf.
138 Statement by the Delegation of the European Communities, Trade Measures
Taken Against Yugoslavia for Non-Economic Reasons, at 2, L/6950 (Dec. 10, 1991),
available at http://www.wto.org/gattdocs/English/SULPDF/91600140.pdf.
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In April 1989, the GATT Council strengthened the dispute settlement process,
establishing a new set of procedures for the automatic establishment of panels any
time a Member State filed a complaint. 139 These new procedures changed the
nature of the debate when Yugoslavia filed a complaint seeking GATT panel
review of the European Community trade sanctions. Given these new procedures,
the GATT Council debate on March 18, 1992 did not address whether Article XXI
was self-judging. Rather, the focus was on institutional competency and the
disruption that a GATT panel would have on the broader peace negotiations. 14 0 As
the European Community stated:
The Community could not see how a panel established at the present
time could aid [the ongoing peace] process. Indeed, it would only
complicate the issue. . . . The [new] rules [on establishing panels] were
silent on the question of whether, in situations where measures taken for
non-economic reasons were involved, a different course could be taken
. . . . Whatever the course of action taken at the present meeting, the
Community reserved its rights as to what constituted standard terms of
reference for a panel which dealt with measures taken for non-economic
reasons.141
The Council approved the establishment of a panel, while recognizing the
European Community's reservations.142 It also encouraged both sides to negotiate
the panel's terms of reference given the invocation of Article XXI.143 Shortly
thereafter, the matter abruptly ended. Yugoslavia's dissolution foreclosed further
GATT proceedings, and no further action was taken with respect to its
complaint.144
139 Decision of 12 April 1989, Improvements to the GATT Dispute Settlement Rules
and Procedures, at 3-4, L/6489 (Apr. 13, 1989), available at http://www.wto.
org/gatt docs/English/SULPDF/91420188.pdf ("If the complaining party so requests, a
decision to establish a panel or working party shall be taken at the latest at the Council
meeting following that at which the request first appeared . . . unless at that meeting the
Council decides otherwise. . . . Panels shall have the following terms of reference unless
the parties to the dispute agree otherwise . . . : 'To examine, in the light of the relevant
GATT provisions, the matter referred to the Contracting Parties . . . and to make such
findings as will assist the Contracting Parties . . . .'). As before, the losing party could
block any adverse GATT Panel. Id. at 7 ("The practice of adopting panel reports by
consensus shall be continued . . . .").
140 GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting Held in the Centre William Rappard on
March 18, 1992, at 14-18, C/M/255 (Apr. 10, 1992), available at http://www.wto.org/
gatt-docs/English/SULPDF/91610102.pdf
141 Id. at 14-15.
142 Id. at 18.
143 id.
144 GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting Held in the Centre William Rappard on June
16-17, 1993, at 3, C/M/264 (July 14, 1993), available at http://www.wto.org/gatt-docs/
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5. Secondary Boycott Against Cuba
On February 24, 1996, a Cuban Air Force Mikoyan MiG-29 shot down two
American civilian airplanes.145 President Clinton's response was immediate: "I
condemn this action in the strongest possible terms."l 46 Three weeks later,
Congress passed the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act
of 1996.147 On signing the LIBERTAD Act, President Clinton stated:
This Act is a justified response to the Cuban government's unjustified,
unlawful attack on two unarmed U.S. civilian aircraft that left three U.S.
citizens and one U.S. resident dead. . . . It is a clear statement of our
determination to respond to attacks on U.S. nationals and of our
continued commitment to stand by the Cuban people in their peaceful
struggle for freedom.14 8
The Act imposed severe economic sanctions, including new sanctions on any
foreign individual or corporation who "traffics in property which was confiscated
by the Cuban Government on or after January 1, 1959."l49 "Traffics" was broadly
defined to include any commercial activity relating to the expropriated property,
thereby imposing liability on many foreign corporations conducting business with
Cuba.
The following day, in the first and only time Article XXI was placed before
the WTO, the European Community filed a request for WTO consultations,
expressing "their profound concern about the apparent lack of conformity of
certain aspects of this Act ... to the international obligations of the United States
under GATT 1994 and GATS."'"' Unless withdrawn or settled, panel review was
guaranteed under the strict new dispute settlement procedures.' 52
English/SULPDF/91720028.pdf; GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting Held in the Centre
William Rappard on June 19, 1992, at 3, C/M/257 (July 10, 1992), available at
http://www.wto.org/gatt-docs/English/SULPDF/91630187.pdf
145 Larry Rohter, Exiles Say Cuba Downed 2 Planes and Clinton Expresses Outrage,
N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 25, 1996, at 1.
146 d
.147 22 U.S.C. § 6021 (2006).
148 Remarks on Signing the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD)
Act of 1996, 32 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 478, 478 (Mar. 12, 1996).
149 22 U.S.C. § 6082.
"s 22 U.S.C. § 6023.
151 Request for Consultations by the European Communities, United States-The
Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, WT/DS38/1 (May 13, 1996).
152 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes art.
4, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex




Unlike all other Article XXI disputes, this time the major powers were on
opposite ends of a security dispute. At the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB)
meeting on October 16, 1996, the United States underscored what was at stake:
[T]he United States would invite the [EC] to reflect on the fact that
certain measures . . . had been expressly justified by the United States
-under the GATT 1947 as measures taken in pursuit of [its] essential
security interests.153
By injecting this disagreement regarding Cuba with the United States over foreign
and security policy into the WTO, the Community had taken this organization into
unexplored territory.
The European Community neither responded to the Article XXI concerns, nor
altered its course of action. 15 4 At the following DSB meeting on November 20,
1996, a WTO panel was automatically established, consistent with the Dispute
Settlement Understanding rules.'5 5 The United States re-emphasized that this
dispute was "not fundamentally a trade issue and thus the trade panel should not be
requested to decide on this matter."' 5 6 It then warned of dire consequences to
come: "proceeding further with this matter would pose serious risks for this new
and invaluable organization, which was only in the early stage of its
development."' 57
Neither the European Community nor the United States wanted a dispute over
the Cuban secondary boycott to undermine the fledgling trade organization, then in
its second year of operation. Both sides had invoked Article XXI to impose
sanctions in the past, and recognized the value in keeping divisive political
disputes out of the WTO. Moreover, the new WTO dispute settlement procedures
included binding commitments that, unlike the GATT procedure, could not be
blocked by Member States.'5 8 For both sides, strategic ambiguity as to the meaning
of Article XXI was at a premium.
Moreover, the political significance of the sanctions had waned for the
Clinton Administration.' 5 9 Many speculated that Clinton's hard-line was calibrated
to appeal to Florida voters in an election year, and with his second term secure, he
'53 Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting Held in the Centre William Rappard
on October 16, 1996, at 7, WT/DSB/M/24 (Nov. 26, 1996), available at
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/dsbminutes/m26.pdf.
154 Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting Held in the Centre William Rappard
on 20 November 1996, at 1, WT/DSB/M/26 (Jan. 15, 1997).
' Id. at 2; see also Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 152, art. 6.
156 Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting Held in the Centre William Rappard
on 20 November 1996, at 2, WT/DSB/M/26 (Jan. 15, 1997).
157 Id.
'5 Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 152, art. 21.
159 See Walt Vanderbush & Patrick J. Haney, Policy toward Cuba in the Clinton
Administration, 114 POL. SC. Q. 387, 406-07 (1999).
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could step back from the WTO precipice.160 On January 3, 1997, Clinton waived
indefinitely the effective date of the secondary boycott provisions of the Act.161
The threat of WTO litigation was clearly a factor in Clinton's decision to stand
down, but so was the changed political climate following his election to a second
term in office.
The Clinton waiver took the wind out of the EU's argument. With the WTO
authorized to provide prospective relief, calculating damages from an Act that
might never take effect would be impossible. At best, the European Community
could win only a Pyrrhic victory. What cost did this represent to the fledgling
WTO? On April 25, 1997, the European Community notified the WTO that it had
requested the Panel to suspend proceedings while a solution mutually agreed to
was negotiated.162 The parties reached a final settlement of the dispute the
following year, with President Clinton promising to amend the LIBERTAD Act to
remove the provisions most offensive to Europe.163 The European Community
quietly let the deadline lapse for pressing its case before the WTO.'16
6. Saudi Arabia's WTO Accession
The most recent Article XXI dispute arose in the context of Saudi Arabia's
accession to the WTO. Since 1995, twenty-five countries have acceded to the
WTO and, with the exception of China,'65 none have been as contentious as the
Saudi application.166 With all applications to the WTO, the membership process is
long and arduous. Unlike accession to most international treaties, becoming a
member of the WTO requires years of negotiations. Seven countries have been
160 See id
61 Steven Lee Myers, One Key Element in Anti-Cuba Law Postponed Again, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 4, 1997, at 1; see also 22 U.S.C. § 6085(b)(1) (2006) ("The President may
suspend the effective date . . . for a period of not more than 6 months if the President
determines .. . that the suspension is necessary to the national interests of the United States
. . . ."); 22 U.S.C. § 6085(b)(2) (2006) ("The President may suspend the effective date ...
for additional periods of not more than 6 months each ... if the President determines ...
that the suspension is necessary to the national interests of the United States . . . .").
162 Communication from the Chairman of the Panel, United States-The Cuban
Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, WT/DS38/5 (Apr. 25, 1997).
163 James Bennet, To Clear Air with Europe, US. Waives Some Sanctions, N.Y.
TIMES, May 19, 1998, at A6.
16 Note by the Secretariat, Lapse of the Authority for Establishment of a Panel,
United States-The Cuban and Democratic Solidarity Act, WT/DS38/6 (Apr. 24, 1998).
165 See generally Raj Bhala, Enter the Dragon: An Essay on China's WTO Accession
Saga, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1469 (2000).
166 These countries are, in order of accession, Ecuador, Bulgaria, Mongolia, Panama,
Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Estonia, Jordan, Georgia, Albania, Oman, Croatia, Lithuania,
Moldova, China, Taiwan, Armenia, Macedonia, Nepal, Cambodia, Saudi Arabia, Vietnam,
Tonga, Ukraine, and Cape Verde. For a discussion of Saudi Arabia's WTO accession, see




negotiating membership for over fifteen years'67 and one country, Algeria, has
been attempting to join for over twenty-three years.16 8 The shortest successful
accession process was just under three years for the Kyrgyz Republic,169 and the
longest was for China, which took just over fifteen years.o70 Saudi Arabia's
accession took over twelve years. 71
Membership negotiations include both bilateral and multilateral
negotiations. 172 The bilateral negotiations address the applicant's promises to
individual members about opening its market to products or services that the
existing member wishes to export to the applicant's market. 7 3 Over a series of
bilateral negotiations, the applicant effectively exchanges current concessions for
the benefits it will enjoy from other countries' market access concessions in past
negotiations.174 Failure to make appropriate concessions with key countries will
result in the delay or denial of membership.175
Notwithstanding the ability of Member States to demand fundamental
concessions of the applicant country, the security exception is routinely invoked in
the accession process. All twenty-five applicant countries that have joined the
WTO since 1995 expressly reserved the right to impose trade restrictions based on
the security exception.'76 Most of the accessions include detailed annexes of
167 These countries (with their application date) are: Algeria (1987), Belarus (1993),
Russia (1993), Seychelles (1995), Sudan (1994), Uzbekistan (1994), and Vanuatu (1994).
See WTO Secretariat, WTO Accessions: 2010 Annual Report by the Director-General, at
21, WT/ACC/14 (Dec. 8, 2010).
168 id
169 See Press Release, World Trade Organization, Kyrgyz Republic to Become WTO
Member, PRESS/i 14 (Oct. 14, 1998), available at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e
/pres98_e/prl 14_e.htm.
o70 See Press Release, World Trade Organization, WTO Successfully Concludes
Negotiations on China's Entry, PRESS/243 (Sept. 17, 2001), available at http://www.
wto.org/english/news-e/pres01_e/pr243e.htm.
17l See Press Release, World Trade Organization, WTO General Council Successfully
Adopts Saudi Arabia's Terms of Accession, PRESS/420 (Nov. 11, 2005), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/news e/pres05 e/pr420_e.htm.
172 Bhala, supra note 165, at 1472.
17 id.
174 Approximately forty members requested China to undertake bilateral negotiations,
and over two dozen asked for the same of Taiwan. Id. at 1473.
' See id. at 1473-77.
176 See Report of the Working Party on the Accession of Albania to the World Trade
Organization, at 31, 62, WT/ACC/ALB/51 (July 13, 2000); Report of the Working Party on
the Accession of Armenia, at 75, WT/ACC/ARM/23 (Nov. 26, 2002); Report of the
Working Party on the Accession of Bulgaria, at 19, 41, WT/ACC/BGR/5 (Sept. 20, 1996);
Report of the Working Party on the Accession of Cambodia, at 79, WT/ACC/K-HM/21
(Aug. 15, 2003); Report of the Working Party on the Accession of Cape Verde, at 22,
WT/ACC/CPV/30 (Dec. 6, 2007); Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China,
at 23, WT/ACC/CHN/49 (Oct. 1, 2001); Report of the Working Party on the Accession of
Croatia, at 13, 19, 55, WT/ACC/HRV/59 (June 29, 2000); Report of the Working Party on
the Accession of Ecuador, at 29, WT/L/77 (July 4, 1995); Report of the Working Party on
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prohibited goods excluded on the basis of Article XXI.' The accession process is
the most transparent example of a country. denying market access on the basis of
the security exception.
In the Working Party Report on Saudi Arabia's accession application, Saudi
Arabia identified over three-dozen categories of goods that were subject to
licensing or import bans on the basis of Article XXI. 7 8 Most of these items
addressed traditional military concerns, although others were targeted at efforts to
restrict terrorism.17 9 Items restricted under the security exception included
chemical fertilizers, Vaseline, military uniforms and helmets, night vision
binoculars, greeting cards with electric circuitry, metal detectors, security cameras,
radar detection equipment, satellite internet receivers, remote control airplanes, and
real or toy pistols. 8 0 When asked by a Member State whether "non-automatic
licenses were actually required and necessary" on all these products, Saudi Arabia
responded that it "had carefully reviewed" the enumerated items and concluded
that the "licenses were required and necessary."' 8 ' Saudi Arabia "further confirmed
that any discretionary authority . . . to suspend imports and exports or otherwise
the Accession of Estonia, at 64, WT/ACC/EST/28 (Apr. 9, 1999); Report of the Working
Party on the Accession of Georgia, at 18, WT/ACC/GEO/31 (Aug. 31, 1999); Report of the
Working Party on the Accession of Jordan, at 42-43, WT/ACC/JOR/33 (Dec. 3, 1999);
Report of the Working Party on the Accession of the Kyrgyz Republic, at 27,
WT/ACC/KGZ/26 (July 31, 1988); Report of the Working Party on the Accession of
Latvia, at 19, WT/ACC/LVA/32 (Sept. 30, 1998); Report of the Working Party on the
Accession of Lithuania, at 16-17, WT/ACC/LTU/52 (Nov. 7, 2000); Report of the
Working Party on the Accession of Macedonia, at 114-17, 122-23, WT/ACC/807/27
(Sept. 26, 2002); Report of the Working Party on the Accession of Moldova, at 29,
WT/ACC/MOL/37 (Jan. 11, 2001); Report of the Working Party on the Accession of
Mongolia, at 8, WT/ACC/MNG/9 (June 27, 1996); Report of the Working Party on the
Accession of Nepal, at 15-16, WT/ACC/NPL/16 (Aug. 28, 2003); Report of the Working
Party on the Accession of Oman, at 33, WT/ACC/OMN/26 (Sept. 28, 2000); Report of the
Working Party on the Accession of Panama, 12, 21, WT/ACC/PAN/19 (Sept. 20, 1996);
Report of the Working Party on the Accession of Saudi Arabia, at 110-16,
WT/ACC/SAU/61 (Nov. 1, 2005); Report of the Working Party on the Accession of
Chinese Taipei [Taiwan], at 23-24, WT/ACC/TPKM/18 (Oct. 5, 2001); Report of the
Working Party on the Accession of Tonga, at 40, 51, WT/ACC/TON/17 (Dec. 2, 2005);
Report of the Working Party on the Accession of Ukraine, at 9, 23-26, 201-02,
WT/ACC/UKR/152 (Jan. 25, 2008); Report of the Working Party on the Accession of
Vietnam, at 167-69, 177, WT/ACC/VNM/48 (Oct. 27, 2006).
177 See supra note 176; see, e.g., Report of the Working Party on the Accession of
Albania to the World Trade Organization, at 31, 62, WT/ACC/ALB/51 (July 13, 2000)
(stating that many items, ranging from matches to munitions to nuclear materials, would be
subject to licensing or import bans because they pose a risk to Albania's national security).
178 Report of the Working Party on the Accession of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to






restrict the quantity of trade would be applied . . . in conformity with the
provisions of the WTO, including Article[] . . .XI82
The other major security issue was Saudi Arabia's boycott of Israel. In its
accession documents, Saudi Arabia confirmed that "the application of secondary
and tertiary boycotts had been terminated in practice and in law."' 83 But Saudi
Arabia made no such formal promises regarding the primary boycott against Israel.
When the United States pressed Saudi Arabia about the primary boycott against
Israel during accession negotiations, it indicated that it would not invoke the non-
application clause,184 and assured the United States that it would apply WTO rules
to all WTO members, including Israel.' 85 Such language was strategically
ambiguous, allowing Saudi Arabia to apply "all WTO rules" toward Israel, would
include the security exception. Six months after Saudi Arabia's accession, the
Saudi Ambassador to the United States, Turki Al-Faisal, announced that Saudi
Arabia would continue the primary boycott against Israel, stating that the "primary
boycott is an issue of national sovereignty guaranteed within the makeup of the
WTO and its rules." 86 The U.S. House of Representatives strongly objected to this
interpretation, unanimously passing a resolution stating:
[I]t is the sense of the Congress that . . . (1) Saudi Arabia should
maintain and fully live up to its commitments under the World. Trade
Organization (WTO) and end all aspects of any boycott on Israel; and
(2) the President . . . should urge Saudi Arabia to end any boycott on
Israel.18 7
The Bush Administration likewise objected to the Saudi's broken promise. "[I]n
[USTR's] view, maintaining the primary boycott of Israel is not consistent with
Saudi Arabia's obligation to extend full WTO treatment to all WTO Members."' 88
When an Israeli trade official was asked whether Israel would challenge the
primary boycott before the WTO, he answered that "we do not wish to politicize
the WTO." 8 9 No doubt Israel was reluctant to bring the Middle East conflict
182 Id. at 54-56.
8 1 d. at 41.
184 CHRISTOPHER BLANCHARD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33533, SAUDI ARABIA:
BACKGROUND AND U.S. RELATIONS 38 (2010), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/
mideast/RL33533.pdf. For a discussion of the non-application clause, see infra text
accompanying notes 192-240.
185 Letter from Robert Portman, U.S. Trade Representative on Saudi Arabia (Aug. 9,
2005), available at http://www.insidetrade.com.
186 Michael Freund, Saudi Ambassador to US Admits Boycott of Israel Still in Force,
JERUSALEM POST, June 22, 2006, at 17.
187 H.R. Con. Res. 370, 109th Cong. (2006).
188 Freund, supra note 186; see Michael Freund, 'Post' Story Puts U.S. Trade Official
Under Fire Over Saudi Flap, JERUSALEM POST, June 25, 2006, at 2.
189 Michael Freund, Israel Not Bringing Arab Boycott to WTO, JERUSALEM POST,
May 5, 2006, at 16.
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before the WTO. Israel (and her strongest ally) was also unlikely to argue that the
security exception was subject to judicial review. Thus, despite strong opposition
to Saudi Arabia's continued boycott of Israel, neither the United States nor Israel
has challenged it before the WTO.190
III. MITIGATING FACTORS
As the State practice outlined above aptly illustrates, a self-judging security
exception raises the specter that a country might engage in WTO-inconsistent
behavior without proper justification. If a Member State can avoid WTO
obligations through the self-judging security exception, what is to prevent bad faith
invocations?
The WTO regime includes a number of devices to address these concerns.
These arrangements could be described as "sovereignty safety valves," giving
Member States broad discretion to respond to political pressure and take unilateral
action to further national interests without violating trade rules.191 As such,
Member States can advance national objectives without the need to invoke the
security exception, thereby reserving it for the limited grounds set forth in the
exception. The regime's flexibility promotes good faith invocation of Article XXI,
diminishing the risks of a self-judging exception.' 9 2
190 This issue likely will arise again with respect to other WTO applicants. For
example, eight Arab League countries are currently pursuing WTO membership. Six of
these-Algeria, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Yemen, and Syria-enforce a primary boycott
against Israel, and three-Iraq, Libya, and Syria-employ a secondary boycott against
Israel. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2010 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON
FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 11-13 (2010), available at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default
/files/uploads/reports/2010/NTE/NTECOMPLETE WITHAPPENDnonameack.pdf.
191 Such as the opt-in approach, the opt-out approach, discretionary benefits, and
nullification and impairment of benefits, each covered in greater detail in Parts III.A-III.D,
infra.
192 The four mitigating factors outlined below are not exhaustive. There are other
provisions-such as the waiver power and safeguard provisions-that advance the security
interests without necessitating invocation of the security exception. For example, the
waiver provision of Article IX(3) has been used by numerous states to restrict importation
of conflict diamonds. See Isabel Feichtner, The Waiver Power of the WTO: Opening the
WTO for Political Debate on the Reconciliation of Competing Interests, 20 EUR. J. INT'L L.
615, 622-25 (2009) (discussing waiver of countries participating in the Kimberley Process
Certification Scheme for Rough Diamonds); Joost Pauwelyn, WTO Compassion or
Superiority Complex?: What to Make of the WTO Waiver for "Conflict Diamonds," 24
MICH. J. INT'L L. 1177, 1182-83 (2003). Similarly, the safeguards provision of Article XIX
authorizes Member States to respond to national economic emergencies. The United States'
use of safeguard measures to protect the U.S. steel industry represents an example of
Member State action taken to protect domestic production that serves national security
interests. Appellate Body Report, United States-Definitive Safeguard Measures on
Imports of Certain Steel Products, T 439, WT/DS253/AB/R (Nov. 10, 2003); see Alan
Sykes, THE WTO AGREEMENT ON SAFEGUARDS: A COMMENTARY 233-34 (2006);
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First, certain international relationships are fraught with such tension that the
temptation for bad faith invocation of Article XXI may be overwhelming. Trading
with the enemy is not something the WTO should require. Fortunately, it does not.
The WTO rules offer an effective tool-the non-application clause-to opt-out of
the normal trade rules when dealing with political adversaries.' 9 3
At the opposite extreme are political allies that desire deeper integration and
trading relationships governed with greater certainty than what Article XXI
affords. The WTO allows for this as well, authorizing Member States to sign
preferential trade agreements that guarantee protections beyond those in the
WTO.19 4 To the extent countries want a security exception with objective
standards, they can opt into such an arrangement.
A third mitigating factor is the use of WTO-authorized sanctions and
incentives. Under the WTO regime, developed countries are encouraged, but not
required, to give preferential tariff benefits to developing countries.'1 5 These
benefits often come with strings attached, allowing Member States to unilaterally
condition preferential tariff benefits on a country's behavior. Because there is no
WTO violation with the imposition of these carrots and sticks, there is no need to
invoke the security exception.
A fourth mitigating factor is the WTO's mechanism to compensate Member
States for trade benefits that are nullified or impaired. Even when there is no WTO
violation, legitimate expectations arising from tariff concession may be
undermined by the imposition of security measures. While a Member State can
reasonably anticipate legitimate security measures that protect the national interest
or restore international peace and security, the same cannot be said of security
measures invoked in bad faith. The non-violation remedy mitigates potential abuse
of the security exception.
A. The Opt-Out Approach
In certain circumstances, the relationship between two countries is so strained
that Member States do not wish to be subject to the normal trading rules. There is
limited room for this, provided exercise of the opt-out provision is invoked at the
appropriate time. Article XIII of the WTO Agreement (Article XXXV under
GATT 1947) allows any existing Member State, upon the accession of a new
Member, to declare that the WTO rules will not apply in their trading relations.196
Youngjin Jung & Ellen Jooyeon Kang, Toward an Ideal WTO Safeguards Regime-
Lessons from U.S. Steel, 38 INT'L LAW. 919, 924 (2004).
193 See infra Part III.A and Part III.B.
194 See Judith L. Goldstein, Douglas Rivers & Michael Tomz, Institutions in
International Relations: Understanding the Effects of the GATT and the WTO on World
Trade, 61 INT'L ORG. 37, 45-47 (2007).
Id.
196 WTO Agreement, supra note 64, art. XIII ("This Agreement and the Multilateral
Trade Agreements . . . shall not apply as between any Member and any other Member if
either of the Members, at the time either becomes a Member, does not consent to such
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The same article also allows any new Member to invoke non-application vis-a-vis
an existing Member.' 97 Once both countries are Members, however, non-
application is a one-way ratchet: a Member State can withdraw a non-application
declaration if the bilateral relationship improves, but it cannot invoke non-
application if a relationship deteriorates.
The historical justification for this provision stems from the super-majority
accession procedure. Since a two-thirds vote is required to secure membership,
those countries that did not wish to trade with a new member could avoid doing so
by invoking Article XXXV. Rather than be "bound by a trade arrangement with a
country to which it had not given its consent,"'9 8 the solution was to allow a
contracting party to opt out of the normal trading rules with respect to that country.
One could impose trade sanctions and other discriminatory measures against an
enemy country without the need to rely on the security exception.
The invocation of Article XXXV is a rare event. Of 11,628 possible state-to-
state bilateral pairings, or dyads, it has been invoked only eighty-eight times over
the life of GATT/WTO.199 And if one looks at these bilateral relationships across
time-each country-pairing for each year as the data points-its frequency is even
less, with approximately 2200 invocations out of 381,656 dyads.2 00 In other words,
non-applications under Article XXXV are relevant in less than one percent of all
bilateral relationships under the GATT/WTO umbrella. Moreover, even when the
provision has been invoked, it almost always is subsequently withdrawn.
Fifty-eight countries have invoked Article XXXV. 20 1 Cuba, the United States,
and Portugal have led the way with eleven, eight, and four invocations,
respectively.202 Twenty-nine countries have been subject to Article XXXV
invocations, with Japan the most frequent recipient, having fifty-one invocations
application."); see also GATT 1947, supra note 9, art. XXXV ("This Agreement . . . shall
not apply as between any contracting party and any other contracting party if: (a) the two
contracting parties have not entered into tariff negotiations with each other, and (b) either
of the contracting parties, at the time either becomes a contracting party, does not consent
to such application.").
' WTO Agreement, supra note 64, art. XIII.
198 ANDREW SHONFIELD & SUSAN STRANGE, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REATIONS IN
THE WESTERN WORLD, 1959-1971, 255 (1976).
199 Raw data available from Judith L. Goldstein, Douglas Rivers & Michael Tomz,
Institutions in International Relations: Understanding the Effects of the GATT and the
WTO on World Trade, 61 INT'L ORG. 37 (2007).
20 Id. at 51-52, 58-59. Their data set counts country-pairs twice each year, once with
each country as the importer. Id. at 51-52. This number is deceptive because the data
measures each year on a time series between dyads, but once a country has entered the
GATT/WTO without invoking Article XXXV, it no longer has the option to later invoke it.
This is a better measure of both the invocation and longevity of non-applications.
201 Raw data available from Goldstein, Rivers & Tomz, supra note 199.
202 Id. (raw data).
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against it.20 3 South Africa and Portugal are a distant second and third respectively,
with a handful of invocations against each.204
While rare, when Article XXXV is invoked, it has the potential to
significantly impact the trade relations between the two countries. According to
one recent study, if both countries invoke non-application against one another,
trade decreased by approximately seventy-five percent.205 "A double invocation . .
. [is] a rare event associated with serious political differences between the two
states,"206 and when it occurs, there is no protection against trade sanctions or other
discriminatory behavior.
Quite often the invocation of Article XXXV represents political strategy
instead of economic concern. For example, Pakistan invoked non-application
against Bangladesh following a bitter civil war and the latter's secession in
1971 .207 The United States invoked non-application against a half-dozen Soviet
bloc countries, 208 and Cuba has done the same with countries aligned with the
West.2 0 9 At least three Arab League countries have opted out of normal trading
relations with Israel. 2 10 Most recently, Turkey invoked non-application against
Armenia as a result of a dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh.2 11
203 See generally id.
204 Id.
205 Id. at 59.
206 Id.
207 Accession of Bangladesh, Invocation of Article XXXV, L/3784 (Nov. 28, 1972),
available at http://www.wto.org/gatt-docs/Englishi/SULPDF/90870049.pdf.
208 Accession of the Republic of Armenia, Invocation by the United States of Article
XIII of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization with Respect
to the Republic of Armenia, WT/L/505 (Dec. 10, 2002); Accession of Georgia, Invocation
by the United States of Article X711 of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization with respect to Georgia, WT/L/3 18 (Oct. 1, 1999); Accession of the
Kyrgyz Republic, Invocation by the United States of Article XIII of the WTO Agreement,
WT/L/275 (Oct. 12, 1998); Accession of the Republic of Moldova, Invocation by the
United States of Article XIII of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
.Organization with respect to Moldova, WT/L/395 (May 4, 2001); Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Invocation ofArticle XII, paragraph 1, by the
United States, WT/L/l 1 (Jan. 27, 1995).
209 Cuba's invocations included Austria, Germany, Peru, Philippines, and Turkey. See
Invocation of Article XXXV by Cuba, GATT/CP/1 11 (Apr. 26, 1951), available at
http://www.wto.org/gatt docs/English/SULPDF/90310017.pdf.
21o The three countries invoking non-application against Israel were Egypt, Tunisia,
and Morocco. See, e.g., Article XXXV, Invocation by Tunisia in Respect of Japan and
Israel, L/ 181 (May 2, 1960), available at http://www.wto.org/gatt docs/English/
SULPDF/90730112.pdf.
211 Accession of the Republic of Armenia, Invocation by the Republic of Turkey of
Article XIII of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization with
respect to the Republic ofArmenia, WT/L/501 (Dec. 3, 2002). The border between the two
countries was closed in 2003 as a result of disagreements over Nagorno-Karabakh, and, but
for Article XXXV, Turkey would have had to resort to Article XXI to justify its behavior.
WTO SECURITY EXCEPTION
The rarity of non-applications is to the surprise of many, especially where
bitter enemies such as China and Taiwan, or Israel and Saudi Arabia have not
exercised their opt-out rights. 2 12 The future may be different. Thirty countries are
currently seeking membership in the WTO, and many of these applicants do not
want for enemies. They include Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iran, Iraq,
the Lebanese Republic, Libya, the Russian Federation, Serbia, Sudan, the Syrian
Arab Republic, and Yemen. 2 13 Even Palestine has sought observer status at the
WTO-a first step toward membership.214 One can anticipate that various
countries will resist WTO membership for these applicants, and if secured by a
two-thirds vote, their accession will occasion non-application invocations.
These examples are clear instances where a political calculus has (or may in
the future) result in non-application declarations. Two other examples discussed
below-involving World War II and colonialism-are historically obscure but
aptly illustrate the same point: countries wishing to avoid normal trading relations
with current or former enemies can readily do so, obviating the need to invoke the
national security exception.
1. Japan in the Aftermath of World War II
As the occupying power in Japan following World War II, the United States
was keen to promote Japanese trade and ease its own economic burden in
financing Japan's recovery. 215 To achieve this end, in 1949 the United States
proposed Japanese membership in GATT.216 With fresh memories from the war,
many Member States greeted this proposal with vigorous opposition. "Several
nations in Asia and in Oceania said that the anti-Japanese sentiment in their
countries growing out of World War II was still so strong that they were
embarrassed by the proposal [and] that it would be politically most unwise to
212 For a discussion of Taiwan's and China's decision not to invoke non-application
against one another, see Steve Charnovitz, Taiwan's WTO Membership and its
International Implications, 1 ASIAN J. OF WTO AND INT'L HEALTH L. POL'Y 401, 418-
19(2006); Hui-Wan Cho, China-Taiwan Tug of War in the WTO, 45 ASIAN SURV. 736,
741-42 (2005); Pasha Hsieh, The China-Taiwan ECFA, Geopolitical Dimensions and
WTO Law, 14 J. INT'L EcON. L. 121, 128 (2011). For Saudi Arabia's decision not to
invoke non-application against Israel, see text and accompanying notes supra Part II.B.6.
The United States strongly pressured Saudi Arabia not to invoke the non-application clause
against Israel. See Bhala, supra note 166, at 754-55.
2' WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, ANNUAL REPORT 2011, at 7 (2011).
214 Seventh Session of the Ministerial Conference, Request for Observer Status by
Palestine, WT/L/775 (Nov. 4, 2009). This is not necessarily a move toward state
independence. The WTO authorizes membership by separate customs territories as well as
countries. Hong Kong, for example, is a WTO member, even though it is not independent
from China.
215 GARDNER PATTERSON, DISCRIMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE POLICY
ISSUES 1945-1965, at 274 (1966).216Id.
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pursue the question at that time." 2 17 These countries even argued that public
sentiment against Japan was so inflamed ''that the governments might find it
difficult to remain in the GATT."2 18 Exacerbating these concerns were legitimate
economic fears that if Japan became a member, other States would face stiff
competition from Japanese goods manufactured with cheap labor.2 19 "The
nightmarish memory of past Japanese behavior and apprehension about future
transgressions might force others to raise their tariffs in self-protection," which
would in turn increase tariff rates for all contracting parties.220
In September 1955, under severe pressure from the United States, Member
States voted to accept Japan's GATT membership.221 To Japan's dismay, however,
an unprecedented fourteen countries invoked the Article XXXV non-application.2 22
Almost forty percent of Japanese exports to GATT members were not subject to
GATT riles. 223 This arrangement allowed a significant minority of GATT
members to discriminate against Japan notwithstanding MFN guarantees. Japan
would continue "to be treated as a second-class citizen by nearly half of [the
GATT] membership." 2 24
Japan spent years trying to convince fellow GATT members to withdraw their
Article XXXV reservations.225 For example, at a GATT Council meeting held on
November 18, 1960, the Japanese delegate stated:
It is almost painful for me to take the floor again on this matter,
[which] has been on the agenda of sessions of the CONTRACTING
PARTIES since . . . 1953 . . . . Almost everywhere discriminatory
measures are applied against trade with Japan whether under the cover of
Article XXXV or under other pretexts. 2 26
217 Id.
218 Id. at 280-81.
219 Id. at 281-82.
220 SAYURI SHIMIZU, CREATING PEOPLE OF PLENTY: THE UNITED STATES AND
JAPAN'S ECONOMIC ALTERNATIVES, 1950-1960, at 35 (2001).
221 Goldstein, Rivers & Tomz, supra note 199, at 43.
222 Accession ofJapan, at 2-4, L/405 (Sept. 13, 1955) (Article XXXV was invoked by
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Cuba, France, Haiti, India, Luxemburg, The
Netherlands, New Zealand, Rhodesia, and Nyasalang, South Africa, and the United
Kingdom). For colonial powers such as France and the United Kingdom, this non-
application also applied to Japanese trade with colonies. Goldstein, Rivers, and Tomz,
supra note 199, at 43.
223 PATTERSON, supra note 215, at 285-86.
224 SHIMIZU, supra note 220, at 47.
225 See, e.g., Application ofArticle XXXV to Japan, L/I 391 (Nov. 29, 1960).
226 Id. at 1-2.
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The stated reason for maintaining Article XXXV stemmed from fears that a flood
of cheap Japanese products would lead to market disruptions.227 But that fear, the
Japanese delegate surmised, was "less real than psychological or political."228
Finally, in 1962, Japan and the United Kingdom signed a bilateral treaty of
Friendship, Navigation, and Commerce, with Britain withdrawing its Article
XXXV non-application reservation. 2 29 One price for securing Britain's withdrawal
was a Japanese commitment to maintain "voluntary export restraints" (VERs), an
arrangement of self-sanction in which Japan imposed quotas on the export of over
sixty sensitive goods. 230 The agreement also provided for the settlement of disputes
outside the GATT framework, precluding judicial review. 2 3 1
In effect, Britain was able to comply with GATT rules of non-discrimination
and still benefit from Japanese self-imposed discriminatory sanctions. Similar
bilateral arrangements were signed with at least twenty other GATT contracting
23parties.232 The rise of VERs allowed the gradual disappearance of de jure
discrimination against Japan, while countries still engaged in de facto
discriminatory trade practices. 233 Throughout this period, non-application
invocations were unnecessary in order to discriminate against Japan.
2. Portugal and the End of Colonialism
On December 14, 1960, the U.N. General Assembly passed Resolution 1514
declaring that "[i]mmediate steps shall be taken, in . . . all . . . territories which
have not yet attained independence, to transfer all powers to the peoples of those
territories, without any conditions or reservations." 2 34 In Africa alone, twenty-five
countries gained independence from 1946 to 1960, and the momentum for self-
235determination was overwhelming.
Portugal was uncompromising in its attitude toward her colonies. An uprising
in Angola in 1961 resulted in brutal Portuguese repression, leading the U.N.
Security Council to condemn the large-scale killings and demand Portugal take
227 Id. at 2-3.
228 Id. at 3.
229 ROGER STRANGE, JAPANESE MANUFACTURING INVESTMENT IN EUROPE: ITS
IMPACT ON THE UK ECONOMY 85 (1993).
230 Id.; NORIKO YOKOI, JAPAN'S POSTWAR ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND ANGLO-
JAPANESE RELATIONS, 1948-1962, at 154 (2003).
231 YOKOI, supra note 230, at 154. Voluntary export restraints are now prohibited
under the WTO. See Agreement on Safeguards, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, at 278,
http://www.wto.org/english/docs e/legal e/25-safeg.pdf (last visited Aug. 3, 2011).
232 SHIMIZU, supra note 220, at 173.
233 Id.
234 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,
G.A. Res. 1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess. Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/4684, at 66 (Dec. 14,
1960).
235 AFRICAN INDEPENDENCE, http://exploringafrica.matrix.msu.edu/images/decolini
zation.jpg (last visited June 28, 2011).
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immediate steps to transfer power to Angola.23 6 The repression in Angola had a
"profound effect" on Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, who recognized that
force might.be necessary to oust the Portuguese from their remaining possessions
in India.2 37 On December 18, 1961, Indian troops stormed the Portuguese enclave
of Goa, ending "the last vestiges of colonialism on the Indian subcontinent."23 8
African leaders praised Nehru's action, stating, "India's take-over of Goa and the
other Portuguese enclaves in India confirmed her position as the bulwark of
freedom and the bastion of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism."2 39
That same month, Angola's nationalist leader, Mario de Andrade, called on
all African nations to sever diplomatic relations with Portugal and aid Angola's
efforts toward independence through an economic boycott of Portugal.24 0 Portugal
was not a threat to these countries, for its political ambitions were simply to
maintain the status quo.241 But when the topic was raised at a GATT Council
Meeting in the context of Portugal's membership application, Ghana warned that,
if necessary, it would invoke the security exception against Portugal:
[U]nder this Article each contracting party was the sole judge of what
was necessary in its essential security interests. There could therefore be
no objection to Ghana regarding the boycott of goods as justified by its
security interests.. . . [A] country's security interests may be threatened
ly a potential as well as an actual danger... . [T]he situation in Angola
was a constant threat to the peace of the African continent and . . . any
action which, by bringing pressure to bear on the Portuguese
Government, might lead to a lessening of this danger, was therefore
justified in the essential security interests of Ghana.242
When Portugal finally became a member in May 1962,243 Ghana did not rely on
Article XXI to justify the boycott. Instead, Ghana, together with Nigeria and India,
invoked the Article XXXV opt-out clause against Portugal, and Portugal
responded in kind.244 This approach gave Ghana greater freedom to avoid (and
236 S.C. Res. 163, U.N. Doc. S/RES/163 (June 9, 1961).
237 R.P. RAO, PORTUGUESE RULE IN GOA 1510-1961, at 3 (1963).23 81 d. at 1, 148.
239 African Nationalists Praise Indian Action, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1961, at 2.
240 Angola Says All-Out Offensive Is Planned Against Portuguese, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
12, 1961, at 18.
241 MELVIN PAGE, COLONIALISM: AN INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL, CULTURAL AND
POLITICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 515-16 (2003). For a detailed discussion of Portugal's
colonial policy in the 1960s, see FILIPE RIBEIRO DE MENESES, SALAZAR: A POLITICAL
BIOGRAPHY 451-543 (2009).
242 GATT Council Meeting, Summary Record of the Twelfth Session, at 196, SR. 19/12
(Dec. 12, 1961).





defer) normal trading relations with a country that embodied the colonial policies it
abhorred.2 4 5 Normal trading relations between Ghana and Portugal did not resume
until 1987, more than a decade after Portugal's colonialism ended.246
B. The Opt-In Approach
The previous discussion addressed political adversaries opting out of normal
trading relations. At the opposite extreme are political allies that want to be
governed by rules that afford greater stability with respect to security exceptions.
The WTO allows for this as well, authorizing Member States to sign preferential
trade agreements (PTAs) that promote closer integration in trading relations.
Article XXIV of GATT 1947 recognizes:
the desirability of increasing freedom of trade by the development,
through voluntary agreements, of closer integration between the
economies of the countries parties to such agreements . . . . Accordingly,
the provisions of this Agreement shall not prevent . . . the formation of a
customs union or of a free-trade area or. the adoption of an interim
agreement necessary for the formation of a customs union or of a free
trade area. 247
In other words, Member States can opt into PTAs with other Member States
without violating MFN rules, as long as doing so is not intended to raise barriers
for other countries. 24 8
Among the many benefits of such arrangements is legal certainty in the realm
of national security. If States so choose, they can opt into special trading
arrangements that incorporate an objective security exception. 2 49 This approach
allows Member States to retain a self-judging security exception for most trading
relationships, but embraces a non-self-judging one for certain relationships. As a
result, these PTAs minimize the significance of the WTO's self-judging security
exception.
245 id
246 Invocation of Article XXXV, Ghana and Portugal, L/6272 (Nov. 25, 1987),
available at http://www.wto.org/gatt-docs/English/SULPDF/91330060.pdf. Normal
trading relations between Portugal and India and Nigeria began in 1975 and 1988,
respectively. Invocation of Article XXXV, Nigeria and Portugal, L/6448 (Dec. 23, 1988),
available at http://www.wto.org/gatt docs/English/SULPDF/91390199.pdf; Application of
Article XXXV, Withdrawal of Invocation by India and Portugal, L/4178 (May 22, 1975),
available at http://www.wto.org/gatt docs/English/SULPDF/90910259.pdf.
247 GATT 1947, supra note 9, art. XXIV:4-5.
248 Id. art. XXIV:4 ("[T]he purpose of a customs union or of a free-trade area should
be to facilitate trade between the constituent territories and not to raise barriers to the trade
of other contracting parties with such territories.").
249 Id. art. XXIV.
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Most PTAs are either customs unions, free trade agreements (FTAs), bilateral
investment treaties (BITs), or the precursor to modem BITs, Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation treaties (FCN treaties). Each type of agreement
includes provisions for national security.
1. Customs Unions
A customs union is a trade bloc with a free trade area and a common external
tariff.2 50 The European Union is the most notable example, but others include the
Andean Community, the East African Community, and the Southern Common
Market (MERCOSUR). Quite often the security exceptions in customs unions use
objective criteria, in sharp contrast to the WTO security exception. 2 5 1
The 1958 Treaty of Rome establishing the European Economic Community
severely limits the authority of Member States to take action in furtherance of
national security interests. Article 223, now Article 296 of the Treaty of
Amsterdam,252 allows an EU Member State not to disclose information that "it
considers contrary to the essential interests of its securities."253 It also authorizes a
Member State to "take such measures as it considers necessary for the protection
of the essential interests of its security which are connected with the production of
or trade in arms, munitions and war material."2 54 But it limits the exercise of that
right if doing so adversely affects conditions of competition in the common market
for civilian or dual-use goods.25 5 It also requires military goods to be on a list
approved by the European Council.256 Notably absent from Article 223 is the right
to invoke a security exception in the event of war or other emergencies in
international relations, or in furtherance of international obligations under the
United Nations Charter. Thus, the self-judging exception in the Treaty of
Amsterdam is limited to arms and security intelligence, and even then, the
measures taken cannot harm the competitive conditions in Europe. The twenty-
seven Member States of the EU have opted into a treaty that severely limits the
ambit of their authority to act in furtherance of their security interests.
250 Kathryn Cameron Atkinson & Catherine Curtiss, United States-Latin American
Trade Law, 21 N.C. J. INT'L L. & CoM. REG. 111, 139 (1995).
252 Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, The Treaties
Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts art. 296, Oct. 2, 1997,
O.J. (C 340) 1.
253 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community art. 223, Mar. 25, 1957,
298 U.N.T.S. 11 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1958).
254 Id.
255 Id. ("[S]uch measures shall not, however, adversely affect the conditions of
competition in the common market regarding products which are not intended for
specifically military purposes.").
256 Id ("During the first year after the entry into force of this Treaty, the Council




Likewise, the customs union established by the Andean Community between
Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela calls for the elimination of all
"duties and restrictions of all kinds levied on the importation of products" from
Member State territories.2 57 Exceptions from this requirement are provided, among
other things, to:
(b) [i]mplement laws and regulations on security; (c) [r]egulate the
import or export of weapons, ammunition, and other war materials, and,
under special circumstances, all other military articles, provided that
this does not interfere with the provisions of treaties in force between
Member Countries relating to the freedom of unrestricted transit; . . .
and (g) [e]xport, use and consume nuclear materials, radioactive
products, or any other material that may be employed for the
development and utilization of nuclear energy.258
The objective language in this security exception excludes any reference to
war or international emergency, and requires limitations on arms control to comply
with international obligations. Moreover, a Member State's unilateral action with
respect to security measures is subject to review by the Secretary General of the
Andean Community. 259 Thus, the five Member States of the Andean Community
have eliminated a self-judging standard, and sharply limited the scope of their
authority to act inconsistent with the Cartagena Agreement in furtherance of
security concerns.
2. Free Trade Agreements
A free trade agreement imposes no duties between the Member States, but
does not have a common external tariff.2 60 Free trade agreements are normally
analyzed in terms of the preferential tariff arrangements provided to signatory
countries. 26 ' But they do much more than that, in many cases limiting the freedom
of Member States to invoke a security exception to violate trade obligations.
Most FTAs include security exceptions, and the norm is to follow the
language of the WTO. For example, every free trade agreement the United States
257 Andean Subregional Integration Agreement (Cartagena Agreement) art. 72, May
26, 1969, http://www.jus.uio.no/english/services/library/treaties/09/9-01/andean
integrationconsolidated.xml.
258 Id. art. 73.
259 Id. art. 74 ("[T]he General Secretariat, on its own initiative or at the request of a
party, shall determine, when necessary, whether a measure adopted unilaterally by a
Member Country constitutes a 'duty' or 'restriction."').
260 See Atkinson & Curtiss, supra note 250; Anne 0. Krueger, Free Trade
Agreements Versus Customs Unions, 54 J. DEV. EcON. 169, 178 (1997).
261 See Krueger, supra note 260, at 173.
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has signed follows this approach, including NAFTA.2 62 But other countries have
opted into an objective standard. For example, in December 1999 the European
Union and South Africa signed a free trade agreement that provides:
The Agreement shall not preclude prohibitions or restrictions on imports,
exports, goods in transit or trade in used goods justified on grounds of
public morality, public policy or public security; the protection of health
and life of humans, animals or plants . . . . Such prohibitions or
restrictions shall not, however, constitute a means of arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination . . . or a disguised restriction on trade
between the Parties. 26 3
This exception not only utilizes objective language, it precludes security measures
taken as "a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination" or as a "disguised
restriction on trade"-conditions embodied in the chapeau of the general
exceptions of GATT Article XX.2 64
Likewise, Israel's free trade agreement with Canada includes objective
language throughout the security exception,265 as do FTAs that the Caribbean
262 See, e.g., North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 2102, Dec.
17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) ("[N]othing in this Agreement shall be construed: (a) to
require any Party to furnish or allow access to any information the disclosure of which it
determines to be contrary to its essential security interests; (b) to prevent any Party from
taking any actions that it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security
interests (i) relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of war and to such
traffic and transactions in other goods, materials, services and technology undertaken
directly or indirectly for the purpose of supplying a military or other security establishment,
(ii) taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations, or (iii) relating to the
implementation of national policies or international agreements respecting the non-
proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; or (c) to prevent any
Party from taking action in pursuance of its obligations under the United Nations Charter
for the maintenance of international peace and security.").
263 Agreement on Trade, Development and Cooperation Between the European
Community and Its Member States, of the One Part, and the Republic of South Africa, of
the Other Part art. 27, L 311/3 (Dec. 4, 1999).
264 See supra text quoted in note 58.
265 Canada-Israel Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Isr., art. 10.2, July 31, 1996 ("Nothing
in this Agreement shall be construed: (a) to require either party to furnish or allow access to
any information the disclosure of which would be contrary to its essential security interests;
(b) to prevent either Party from taking any actions necessary for the protection of its
essential security interests: (i) relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of
war and to such traffic and transactions in other goods, materials, services and technology
undertaken directly or indirectly for the purpose of supplying a military or other security
establishment, (ii) taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations, or (iii)
relating to the implementation of national policies or international agreements respecting
the non-proliferation of biological, chemical, nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices; or (c) to prevent either Party from taking action in pursuance of its obligations
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Community has signed with Costa Rica2 66 and the Dominican Republic. 2 67 Israel
also has a FTA with Turkey that includes objective language on trade in arms.268
3. Bilateral Investment Treaties
In addition to FTAs, Member States have also signed thousands of bilateral
investment treaties (BIT), many of which include objective language in their
under the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of international peace and
security.").
266 CARICOM-Costa Rica Free Trade Agreement, art. XVI.02, Mar. 9, 2004
("Pursuant to Article XXI (Security Exceptions) of the GATT 1994, nothing in this
Agreement shall be construed: (a) to require any Party to furnish or allow access to any
information the disclosure of which it determines to be contrary to its essential security
interests; (b) to prevent any Party from taking any actions considered necessary for the
protection of its essential security interests: (i) relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition
and implements of war and to such traffic and transactions in other goods, materials,
services and technology undertaken directly or indirectly for the purpose of supplying a
military or other security establishment; (ii) adopted in time of war or other emergency in
international relations; or (iii) relating to the implementation of national policies or
international agreements regarding the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices; or (c) to prevent any Party from taking action in pursuance of its
obligations under the United Nations Charter for the Maintenance of International Peace
and Security.").
267 CARICOM-Dominican Free Trade Agreement, art. VII, Aug. 22, 1998 ("Nothing
in this Agreement shall prevent the adoption or enforcement by the Dominican Republic or
any Member State of CARICOM of measures: (i) which are necessary (a) to protect public
morals; (b) to prevent crime or the maintenance of public order; (c) to protect its essential
security interests; (d) to protect human, animal and plant life; (e) to secure compliance with
laws or regulations which are not consistent with the provisions of this, Agreement,
including those relating to customs enforcement, the enforcement of monopolies operated
under paragraph 4 of Article II and Article XVII of GATT 1994, the protection of patents,
trademarks and copyrights and the prevention of deceptive practices; (f) and essential to the
acquisition or distribution of products in general or local short supply; provided that any
such measure shall be consistent with the principle that the Parties are entitled to an
equitable share of the international supply of such products, and that any such measures,
which are inconsistent with the other provisions of the Agreement, shall be discontinued as
soon as the conditions giving rise to them have ceased to exist . . ).
268 Israel-Turkey Free Trade Agreement, Isr.-Turk., art. 31, May 1, 1997 ("Nothing in
this Agreement shall prevent a Party from taking any measures: (a) which it considers
necessary to prevent the disclosure of information contrary to its essential security
interests; (b) which relate to the production of, or trade in, arms, munitions or war materials
or to research, development or production indispensable for defense purposes, provided
that such measures do not impair the conditions of competition in respect of products not
intended for specifically military purposes; (c) which it considers essential to its own
security in the event of serious internal disturbances affecting the maintenance of law and
order, in time of war or other serious international tension constituting threat of war or in




security exceptions.269 Such investment guarantees are sometimes incorporated
into FTAs, as with NAFTA. 2 70 More commonly they are stand-alone treaties
providing guarantees of compensation for unlawful takings, non-discrimination,
fair and equitable treatment, and procedural due process.271
As for security exceptions in BITs, the most notable is the Argentina-United
States BIT, which, following Argentina's currency crisis, has been the subject of
several International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)
272investment arbitrations. The relevant security exception provides: "The Treaty
shall not preclude the application by either Party of measures necessary for the
maintenance of public order, the fulfillment of its obligation with respect to the
maintenance or restoration of international peace or security, or the protection of
its own essential security interests."2 73 Argentina has invoked this exception in
every ICSID case involving an American investor, and each time the ICSID
tribunals have concluded that the exception is not self-judging.2 74 As the tribunal in
CMS Gas stated, "when States intend to create for themselves a right to determine
unilaterally the legitimacy of extraordinary measures importing non-compliance
with obligations assumed in a treaty, they do so expressly. The examples of the
269 For a discussion of the substantive guarantees in bilateral investment treaties, see
KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES: HISTORY, POLICY, AND
INTERPRETATION, 189-516 (2010); THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW, 227-684 (Peter Muchlinski, Federico Ortino and Christoph Schreuer,
eds. 2008).
270 See North American Free Trade Agreement, supra note 262, art. 1018.
271 See, e.g., infra note 276.
272 Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award (Sept. 5, 2008)
[hereinafter Continental Casualty Award]; Enron Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case
No. ARB/01/3, Award (May 22, 2007) [hereinafter Enron Award]; CMS Gas Transmission
Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Annulment Proceeding (Sept. 25,
2007) [hereinafter CMS Annulment Proceeding]; Sempra Energy Int'l v. Argentina, ICSID
Case No. ARB/02/16, Award (Sept. 28, 2007) [hereinafter Sempra Award]; LG&E Energy
Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability (Oct. 3,
2006) [hereinafter LG&E Award]; CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic,
ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award (May 12, 2005) [hereinafter CMS Award].
273 Agreement Between the United States of America and the Argentine Republic
Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, U.S.-Arg., art.
XI, Nov. 14, 1991, 31 I.L.M. 124, 135.
274 CMS Annulment Proceeding, supra note 272, 119-27 (refusing to annul award
based on CMS Award's finding that Article XI is not self-judging); CMS Award, supra
note 272, $T 370-73; Continental Casualty Award, supra note 272, $ 182-88; Enron
Award, supra note 272, T 331; LG&E Award, supra note 272, 212-13; Sempra Award,
supra note 272, 379-83. For a discussion of these cases, see Andrea K. Bjorklund,
Emergency Exceptions: State of Necessity and Force Majeure, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 459, 503-05 (Peter Muchlinski, Federico Ortino &
Christoph Schreuer eds., 2008); Jilrgen Kurtz, Adjudging the Exceptional at International




GATT [Article XXI] and bilateral investment treaty provisions offered above are
eloquent examples of this approach." 2 7 5
Following these ICSID interpretations, in November 2004 the United States
modified its Model BIT to adopt WTO-style self-judging language:
[n]othing in this Treaty shall be construed: (1) to require a Party to
furnish or allow access to any information the disclosure of which it
determines to be contrary to its essential security interests; or (2) to
preclude a Party from applying measures that it considers necessary for
the fulfillment of its obligations with respect to the maintenance or
restoration of international peace or security, or the protection of its own
essential security interests.276
Finally, some BITs have gone to the other extreme-omitting a national
security exception altogether. The ICSID tribunal in BG Group interpreted the
absence of such an exception in the Argentina-United Kingdom BIT27 7 to preclude
Argentina from invoking a state of emergency on the basis of the BIT.278 Rather
than adopt an objective standard, these treaties make no provision for a security
exception, sharply curtailing the freedom of States to act consistent with their
security interests without violating their BIT obligations.
4. Freedom, Commerce, and Navigation Treaties
As the precursors to the modern BITs, Freedom, Commerce, and Navigation
treaties also included security exceptions, often with objective language. The
United States' model FCN treaty provided that:
The present Treaty shall not preclude the application of measures: . . . (b)
relating to fissionable materials, to radioactive by-products . . . or to
materials that are the source of fissionable materials; (c) regulating the
production of or traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of war, or
traffic in other materials carried on directly or indirectly for the purpose
of supplying a military establishment; (d) necessary to fulfill the
obligations of a Party for the maintenance or restoration of international
279peace or security or necessary to protect its essential security interests.
275 CMS Award, supra note 272, T 370.
276 U.S. Model BIT art. 18 (2004), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization
/117601 .pdf.
277 BG Group Plc. v. Argentina, UNCITRAL, Final Award, 381-87 (Dec. 24,
2007).
278 Id. T 387; see also Nat'l Grid Plc. v. Argentina, UNCITRAL, Award, 255 (Nov.
3, 2008).
279 Charles H. Sullivan. Report on the Standard Provisions of the Treaty of
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation as They Evolved Through Jan. 1, 1962, in 1 U.S.
TREATIES OF FRIENDSHIP, COMMERCE AND NAVIGATION: STUDIES 39 (1970).
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By 1962, the United States had signed forty-three FCN treaties. 280 The most
significant of these were the treaties with Nicaragua and Iran, both of which were
the subject of ICJ litigation.28 1 In the ICJ's landmark judgment of Military and
Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua, it distinguished the objective
language in the United States-Nicaragua FCN with the self-judging language in
Article XXI of GATT:2 82
by the terms of the [FCN] Treaty itself, whether a measure is necessary
to protect the essential security interests of a party is not . . . purely a
question for the subjective judgment of the party; [unlike GATT] the text
does not refer to what the party "considers necessary" for that purpose. 2 83
This textual distinction led the ICJ to conclude that the FCN security exception
was not self-judging, and that the trade embargo against Nicaragua violated the
284FCN treaty. As Jos6 Alvarez has stated, "[t]he ICJ found that the 'it' in this key
phrase . . . makes GATT-type language self-judging rather than subject to the
judgment of an external decision maker." 28 5 Notably, the United States trade
embargo triggered legal action by Nicaragua before both the ICJ and GATT. The
self-judging language led to no action under GATT,28 6 and a successful action
under the objective language of the FCN.
Likewise in 2003, the ICJ interpreted the security exception in the Iran-United
States FCN-with language identical to the United States' FCN with
Nicaragua 287-to incorporate an objective standard subject to judicial review.
280 Id. at 51-58.
281 See Pieter H.F. Bekker, The World Court Finds that U.S. Attacks on Iranian Oil
Platforms in 1987-1988 Were Not Justifiable as Self-Defense, but the United States Did
Not Violated the Applicable Treaty with Iran, AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
(2003) (discussing an ICJ decision regarding an FCN treaty between the United States and
Iran), http://www.asil.org/insighl19.cfm; infra note 282 (discussing ICJ litigation dealing
with the Nicaragua treaty).
282 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 1 222 (June 27). The relevant provisions of the FCN stated "the
present Treaty shall not preclude the application of measures . .. (d) necessary to fulfill the
obligations of a Party for the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security,
or necessary to protect its essential security interests." See id. 221.2 83 Id. $ 282.
284 Id
285 Opinion of Jos6 E. Alvarez, Sempra Energy Int'l & Camuzzi Int'l v. Republic of
Argentina, ARB/02/16 and ARB/03/02, at 6 (Sept. 12, 2005), http://ita.law.uvic.cal
documents/CamuzziSempraAlvarezOpinion.pdf.
286 See supra text accompanying notes 100-126.
287 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights, U.S.-Iran, art.
XX(1)(d), Aug. 15, 1955, T.I.A.S. No. 3853 ("The present Treaty shall not preclude the
application of measures (d) necessary to fulfill the obligations of a High Contracting Party
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"[W]hether a given measure is 'necessary' is 'not purely a question for the
subjective judgment of the party' and may thus be assessed by the Court."288 As a
result, the Court concluded that the United States had failed to satisfy the necessity
criterion.289
The exclusion of the self-judging language in these FCN treaties was critical to
the ICJ's determinations. The FCN treaties incorporate an objective standard
subject to judicial review, while the GATT security exception adopts a subjective
standard that is purely for the judgment of the party invoking it.2 90
C. Discretionary Benefits
In addition to the opt-out and the opt-in approaches, discretionary tariff
preferences serve as the third major factor that mitigates bad faith applications of
the security exception. The WTO rules authorize developed countries to "accord
differential and more favourable treatment to developing countries, without
according such treatment to other contracting parties." 29 1 These benefits under
these so-called "Generalized System of Preferences" (GSP) are subject to
"negative conditionality"-conditions that must be satisfied for a developing
country to receive the benefit.292 Because these benefits are discretionary, a
Member State can grant, deny, suspend, or remove them if doing so is in the
national interest.293
Moreover, these benefits may be accorded "notwithstanding the [MFN]
provisions of Article 1 of the General Agreement." 29 4 In other words, preferential
treatment for developing countries is not discrimination against developed
countries. Granting or denying GSP benefits is not a WTO violation, therefore
there is no need to invoke a WTO exception to grant or deny these benefits. Rather
than resort to measures that violate WTO rules-such as a trade embargo-the first
place developed countries typically turn to punish a misbehaving developing
country is to withdraw discretionary tariff preferences. 29 5
for the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security, or necessary to
protect its essential security interests.").
288 Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Judgment on the Merits, 2003 I.C.J. 161, 43 (Nov.
6).
289 Id. T 76-78; see also Alvarez, supra note 285, at 35-36.
290 See GATT 1947, supra note 9, art. XXI.
291 Differential and More Favourable Treatment Reciprocity and Fuller Participation
of Developing Countries, L/4903 (Nov. 28, 1979), GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.), at 191
(1980) [hereinafter Differential Treatment], available at http://www.wto.org/english/
docs_e/legal-e/enabling e.pdf.
292 See Julia Ya Qin, Defining Nondiscrimination Under the Law of the World Trade
Organization, 23 B.U. INT'L L.J. 215, 293 (2005).
293 See id. at 282.
294 Diferential Treatment, supra note 291, at 191.
295 See Qin, supra note 292, at 293.
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Thus far, the WTO Appellate Body has identified only one significant
limitation on the granting and withdrawal of GSP benefits: similarly situated
developing countries cannot be treated differently.2 96 Thus, in reviewing whether
the European Union's drug-trafficking condition for GSP eligibility was consistent
with the WTO, the Appellate Body concluded that the policy "may be found
consistent with the 'non-discriminatory' requirement . .. only if the [EU] proves,
at a minimum, that the preferences granted under the Drug Arrangements are
available to all GSP beneficiaries 'that are similarly affected by the drug
problem." 297
The GSP programs of the United States and the European Union illustrate the
use of discretionary benefits to sanction Member States without the need to invoke
a security exception. Targeted countries have little recourse to challenge the
withdrawal of a discretionary benefit.
1. The United States GSP Program
Under its GSP scheme, the United States imposes eligibility criteria that
exclude developing countries from benefits if they engage in conduct inconsistent
with American interests.298 The criteria to be a GSP beneficiary exclude countries
that: (1) are communist; 299 (2) are members of an international cartel (such as
OPEC);3 00 (3) aid and abet international terrorism; 30' (4) fail to protect American
commercial interests; 3 02 (5) violate international labor standards; 3 03 (6) fail to
eliminate "the worst forms of child labor"; 3 04 and (7) fail to adequately address
drug-trafficking.305
296 See Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Conditions for the Granting
of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries,'f 153-62, WT/DS246/AB/R (Apr. 7,
2004).
297 Id. 180.
298 See Qin, supra note 292, at 282.
299 19 U.S.C. § 2462(b)(2)(A) (2006) ("The President shall not designate any country
a beneficiary developing country if . .. (A) such country is a Communist country, unless
... (ii) such country is a WTO member . . . and a member of the International Monetary
Fund, and (iii) such country is not dominated or controlled by international communism.").
300 Id. § 2462(b)(2)(B).
301 Id. § 2462(b)(2)(F).
302 Id. § 2462(b)(2)(D)-(E) (ineligibility for nationalizing American property or
failing to honor arbitral awards).
303 Id. § 2462(b)(2)(G); see also id. § 2467(4) (labor standards include the right of
association, the right to organize and bargain collectively, prohibition on forced labor, and
maintenance of acceptable working conditions).
30 Id § 2462(b)(2)(H).
305 United States Andean Trade Preference Act-Decision of 14 October 1996,
WT/L/184 (Oct. 14, 1996), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments
/t/WT/L/184.WPF; see also, e.g., Proclamation No. 8323, 73 Fed. Reg. 72,677 (Nov. 28,
2008) (suspending Bolivia from benefits of the Andean Trade Promotion Act).
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Pursuant to these eligibility criteria, approximately twenty-five percent of
developing countries do not receive GSP benefits.306 Among the dozens of
countries excluded are WTO members such as Bulgaria, China, Cuba, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Honduras, Morocco, Myanmar, Nicaragua, and Vietnam.30 7 By placing
these countries at a competitive disadvantage relative to other developing
countries, the United States can punish countries that act contrary to its interests
without violating WTO rules or resorting to the security exception.
To illustrate, on September 15, 2008, President Bush withdrew Bolivia's
eligibility for preferential benefits under a special tariff program closely related to
its GSP program, the Andean Trade Preference Act.3 08 He did so because Bolivia
had "failed demonstrably . . . to adhere to its obligations under international
counternarcotics (CN) agreements." 3 09 As a result, imports into the United States
from Bolivia decreased thirty-four percent in 2009, from $188 million in 2008 to
$124 million in 2009.310 On June 30, 2009, President Obama affirmed that
determination, and ordered that "no duty free treatment or other preferential
treatment" should be extended to Bolivia. 311 Among the negative findings were
"explicit acceptance and encouragement of coca production at the highest levels of
the Bolivian government." 3 12 Rather than impose trade barriers that violate the
WTO, necessitating an Article XXI exception, the United States simply removed
trade benefits consistent with its rights under the WTO.3 13
2. The European Union GSP Plus (GSP+) Program
The European Union's approach to preferential tariffs uses both carrots and
sticks. Standard GSP preferences are available to 176 developing countries, but
preferences may be withdrawn if the beneficiary country: (1) violates core treaties
306 DANIEL ANTHONY, UNILATERAL PREFERENTIAL TARIFF PROGRAMS OFFERED BY
THE UNITED STATES, THE EUROPEAN UNION, AND CANADA: A COMPARISON 6, 18 (Dec.
2008), available at http://www.tradepartnership.com/pdf files/GSPComparison.pdf
(noting that the United States grants GSP benefits to 130 countries, compared to more than
170 developing countries that receive European Union and Canadian GSP benefits).
307 Information on Countries Eligible for GSP, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/ATT%20(A)%20-%20090417%
20GSP BDC.pdf (last visited June 19, 2011).
309 PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA, WHITE HOUSE, DETERMINATIONS AND REPORT OF
THE PRESIDENT CONCERNING THE REVIEW OF ECUADOR AND BOLIVIA UNDER THE ANDEAN
TRADE PREFERENCE ACT, As AMENDED 3 (June 30, 2009) [hereinafter REPORT
CONCERNING ECUADOR AND BOLIVIA], available at http://www.ustr.gov/webfm
send/1 184; see also Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA), 19 U.S.C. § 3202 (2006).
309 Id. at 3.
310 RON KIRK, U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, FIFTH REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON
THE OPERATION OF THE ANDEAN TRADE PREFERENCE ACT AS AMENDED 16 (June 30,
2010), available at http://www.ustr.gov/node/5979.
31' REPORT CONCERNING ECUADOR AND BOLIVIA, supra note 307, at 1.
312 Id. at 3.
313 KIRK, supra note 310, at 1.
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relating to human rights, the environment, drug-trafficking, and corruption; (2)
exports goods made from prison labor; (3) fails to effectively control illicit drugs
or money-laundering; or (4) engages in systematic and unfair trading practices. 3 14
Further special incentive preferences under the GSP+ program are granted to
developing countries that have ratified and effectively implemented twenty-seven
core human rights, labor, environmental, drug-trafficking, and anti-corruption
conventions.1 Thus far, sixteen developing countries have satisfied the eligibility
requirements for special incentives.3 16
314 Council Regulation 980/2005, art. 16, 2005 O.J. (L169) I (EC).
315 Id. art. 9. The sixteen core human and labor rights conventions are (1) International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; (2) International Convention on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights; (3) International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination; (4) Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women; (5) Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading
Treatment or Punishment; (6) Convention on the Rights of the Child; (7) Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide; (8) Convention concerning
Minimum Age for Admission to Employment; (9) Convention conceming the Prohibition
and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour; (10)
Convention concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour; (11) Convention concerning
Forced or Compulsory Labour; (12) Convention concerning Equal Remuneration of Men
and Women Workers for Work of Equal Value; (13) Convention concerning
Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation; (14) Convention concerning
Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise; (15) Convention
concerning the Application of the Principles of the Right to Organise and to Bargain
Collectively; and (16) International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the
Crime of Apartheid. Id. Annex III. The eleven environmental, drug-trafficking, and anti-
corruption conventions are: (1) Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone
Layer; (2) Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous
Wastes and Their Disposal; (3) Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants;
(4) Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora; (5)
Convention on Biological Diversity; (6) Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety; (7) Kyoto
Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change; (8) United
Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (1961); (9) United Nations Convention on
Psychotropic Substances (1971); (10) United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (1988); and (11) United Nations Convention
against Corruption (Mexico). See id. As of January 1, 2012, all twenty-seven conventions
must be ratified and effectively implemented for a developing country to be eligible for the
GSP+ special incentives. See Generalised System of Preferences (GSP), EUROPEAN
COMM'N, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/wider-agenda/development/generalised-system-of-
preferences/; see also Press Release, European Comm'n, Focusing on needs: the EU
reshapes its import scheme for developing countries (May 10, 2011), available at
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=707.
316 Commission Decision 2008/938, art. 1, 2008 O.J. (L 334) 90 (EC) (the countries
meeting the special incentives criteria are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa
Rica, Ecuador, Georgia, Guatemala, Honduras, Sri Lanka, Mongolia, Nicaragua, Peru,
Paraguay, El Salvador, and Venezuela).
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This arrangement allows the EU to calibrate tariff preferences at two levels:
sanctioning bad behavior by withdrawing general GSP preferences, and
encouraging good behavior through unusually beneficial GSP+ preferences. To
illustrate, in February 2010, the European Commission announced that Sri Lanka
would no longer receive GSP+ benefits due to its human rights record .3 The
suspension would take effect on August 15, 2010, "giving Sri Lanka extra time to
address the problems identified."3 18 An expert report commissioned by the EU
concluded that Sri Lanka had failed to effectively implement major human rights
conventions. 3 19 Among the issues of concern were unlawful killings, torture, illegal
arrests and detention, disappearances, inadequate access to justice, racial
discrimination, and infringement of the freedom of movement, assembly,
expression, and religion. 32 0
The GSP+ trade benefits-worth over $136 million per year to Sri Lanka-
were jeopardized because of civilian deaths in the final phase of the government's
war against the Tamil Tigers.32 1 In June 2010, the EU identified several changes
Sri Lanka had to implement to avoid losing the special preferences.322 They
included repealing emergency regulations, amending the Code of Criminal
Procedure, allowing citizens to submit complaints to the U.N. Human Rights
Commission, publishing a list of Tamil Tigers in custody, and providing
guarantees on freedom of the press.323
Sri Lanka did not meet these conditions, and the GSP+ benefits were
withdrawn in August 20 10.324 Key sectors of the Sri Lankan economy are now
suffering the consequences. Tariffs on textiles have lost a 9.6 percent advantage,
and bicycles and frozen fish have lost an 11.5 and 18.5 percent advantage,
respectively. 325 One Sri Lankan apparel industry expert stated that "there's a grave
317 Press Release, European Comm'n, EU Temporarily Withdraws GSP+ Trade
Benefits from Sri Lanka (Feb. 15, 2010), available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib
/press/index.cfm?id=515.31 id.
319 FRANQOISE HAMPSON, LEIF SEV6N & ROMAN WIERUSZEWSKI, EUROPEAN
COMM'N, FINAL REPORT: THE IMPLEMENTATION OF CERTAIN HUMAN RIGHTS
CONVENTIONS IN SRI LANKA 118 (2009), available at http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/
RWFiles2009.nsf/FilesByRWDocUnidFilename/SNAA-7WZ5BY-
full report.pdf/$File/full-report.pdf.
320 Id. at 31-117.
321 Bate Felix & Susan Fenton, EU to Halt Sri Lanka Trade Preferences Amid Human
Rights Concern, REUTERS, (Feb. 15, 2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/02/
15/idUSLDE61ElWO.
322 Sandun A. Jayasekera, GSP+ to End Midnight Today, DAILY MIRROR (Aug. 14,
2010), http://print.dailymirror.lk/news/front-page-news/18479.html.
323 Id.
324 EU to Withdraw Sri Lanka Trade Concession Deal, BBC (July 5, 2010),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10514634.
325 DT Kingsley Bernard, Ways to Cushion Economic Shock After GSP+ Withdrawal,
DAILY NEWS (Sept. 2, 2010), http://www.dailynews.lk/2010/09/02/bus21.asp.
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threat of GSP-related orders moving out of Sri Lanka . .. to countries like India or
Bangladesh."3 26
In sum, the European Union advanced its foreign policy objectives in Sri
Lanka by withdrawing benefits consistent with its WTO obligations. Rather than
resort to draconian measures that violate the WTO-such as a trade embargo or
import quota-removing tariff benefits obviated the need to invoke the Article
XXI security exception.
D. Nullification and Impairment ofBenefits
In rare cases, a Member State may challenge the conduct of another Member
State that nullifies or impairs expected trade benefits, even in the absence of a
WTO violation.3 27 The theory of the "non-violation remedy" is that Member State
action that does not violate the WTO may nonetheless undermine the benefits of
promises made during tariff negotiations. 32 8 "The idea underlying [the non-
violation remedy] is that the improved competitive opportunities that can
legitimately be expected from a tariff concession can be frustrated not only by
measures proscribed by the General Agreement but also by measures consistent
with that Agreement."329
326 Santhush Fernando & Azhar Razak, GSP Crisis Prompts Top Apparel Firms to
Look Beyond Lanka, THE BoTToM LINE (Sept. 5, 2010), http://www.thebottomline.lk
/2010/09/05/pagel.html (quoting Joint Apparel Association Forum (JAAF) secretary-
general Rohan Masakorala).
327 GATT 1947, supra note 9, art. XXIII ("If any contracting party should consider
that any benefit accruing to it directly or indirectly under this Agreement is being nullified
or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the Agreement is being impeded as
the result of.. . (b) the application by another contracting party of any measure, whether or
not it conflicts with the provisions of this Agreement. . . the contracting party may, with a
view to the satisfactory adjustment of the matter, make written representations or proposals
to the other contracting party or parties which it considers to be concerned."); id. art.
XXIII(2) ("If the CONTRACTING PARTIES consider that the circumstances are serious
enough to justify such action, they may authorize a contracting party or parties to suspend
the application to any other contracting party or parties of such concessions or other
obligations under this Agreement as they determine to be appropriate in the
circumstances.").
328 James P. Durling & Simon N. Lester, Original Meanings and the FILM Dispute:
The Drafting History, Textual Evolution, and Application ofNon- Violation Nullification or
Impairment Remedy, 32 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 211, 213 (1999).
329 Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos
and Asbestos-Containing Products, 185, WT/DSl35/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001) [hereinafter
EC-Asbestos (Appellate Body)] (emphasis and citations omitted), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/dispu_e/135abre.pdf; see also Panel Report, Japan
-Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper, TI 10.79-10.80,
WT/DS44/R (Mar. 31, 1998) [hereinafter Japan-Measures Affecting Consumer Film],
available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispu e/44r00.pdf; Panel Report,
European Economic Community-Payments and Subsidies Paid to Processors and
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The remedy for a successful non-violation claim is unique. Because there is
no WTO violation, the Member State is not required to remove the measure that
nullifies or impairs the anticipated benefit. 33 0 As for damages, the WTO's
recommendation is for a "mutually satisfactory adjustment,"331 a standard that is
distinct from, and likely lower than, violation cases where the level of authorized
suspension of concessions is "equivalent to the level of nullification or
impairment." 332
The drafting history indicates that the non-violation remedy was intended to
cover measures invoked under the security exception.3 The Indian delegation, in
particular, considered it critical to provide Member States with the power to
challenge abuses of the security exception using the non-violation remedy, because
"the knowledge of the possibility of such counter action would serve as a deterrent
to any misuse of the [security] exceptions."33 4 The drafting committee recognized
that this remedy was appropriate for security exception invocations:
The working party considered that this sub-paragraph [on the NVNI
remedy] would apply to the situation of action taken by a Member ...
pursuant to [Article XXI of GATT 1947]. Such action, for example, in
the interest of national security in time of war or other international
emergency would be entirely consistent with the Charter, but might
nevertheless result in the nullification or impairment of benefits accruing
to other Members. Such other Members could, under those
circumstances, have the right to bring the matter before the Organization,
not on the ground that the measure taken was inconsistent with the
Charter, but on the ground that the measure so taken effectively nullified
benefits accruing to the complaining Member. 3 35
Producers of Oilseeds and Related Animal-Feed Proteins, 144-46, GATT/L6627-
37S/86 (Dec. 14, 1989) (adopted Jan. 25, 1990), available at http://www.wto.org/
english/tratop e/dispu_e/88oilsds.pdf; Panel Report, Treatment By Germany of Imports of
Sardines, T 16, GATT/G/26-IS/53 (Oct. 31, 1952), available at http://www.wto.org/
english/tratop e/dispue/52sardns.pdf; Panel Report, The Australian Subsidy on
Ammonium Sulphate, T 12, GATT/CP 4/39 (Apr. 3, 1950), available at http://www.wto.
org/english/tratope/dispue/50amosul.pdf.
330 Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 152, art. 26:1(b).
331 id
332 Id. art. 22:4.
333 See C. O'Neal Taylor, Impossible Cases: Lessons Learned from the First Decade
of WTO Dispute Settlement, 28 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 309, 389 (2007); see also Notes of
the Second Meeting, infra note 334, at 1.
334 Conference on Trade and Employment, Jan. 10, 1948, Notes of the Second
Meeting, Sixth Committee: Organization, Sub-Committee I (Article 94), T 3, E/Conf
.2/C.6/W.32 (1948), available at http://www.wto.org/gatt-docs/English/SULPDF
/90200141.pdf
335 Conference on Trade and Development, Jan. 9, 1948, Report of Working Party of




Thus, the non-violation remedy addresses security measures that cannot reasonably
be anticipated, discouraging unreasonable invocations, and is available to a
Member State subject to unforeseeable trade sanctions.
Recourse to the non-violation remedy has been rare, reflecting the fact that it
is an "exceptional remedy" that "should be approached with caution." , 6 This
follows from the fact that Member States "negotiate the rules that they agree to
follow and only exceptionally would expect to be challenged for actions not in
contravention of those rules."3 37 The infrequent success of a non-violation remedy
suggests that this approach may be relevant in only the most controversial national
security invocations.
A non-violation claim is available when a concession has been negotiated and
a subsequent measure is adopted that could not have been reasonably anticipated,
thereby reducing the value of the negotiated concession.3 38 A Member State
invoking a non-violation claim has the burden of establishing that a benefit has
been nullified or impaired as a result of the other Member State's lawful action.3 39
In meeting that burden, the key question is whether a trade restriction "could
reasonably have been anticipated at the time" the Member States were negotiating
tariff concessions.340 If a future security measure is reasonably foreseeable at the
time Member States engage in tariff negotiations, then a benefit has not been
nullified or impaired when the subsequent measure is imposed. 34 1
Thus, for example, in the case of European Communities-Measures Affecting
Asbestos, the WTO panel held that Canada could reasonably anticipate that France
might adopt restrictive measures-including an import ban-on the use of
asbestos.342 The accumulated scientific evidence over the course of several decades
may not have made a future import ban certain, but it created "a climate which
should have led Canada to anticipate a change in the attitude of importing
countries." 343 Mofeover, public health measures taken by other Member States
created "an environment in which the adoption of similar measures by France, is
336 EC-Asbestos (Appellate Body), supra note 329, 186.
3 Japan-Measures Affecting Consumer Film, supra note 329, 10.36.
338 Kyle Bagwell et al., The Boundaries of the WTO: It's a Question of Market
Access, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 56, 65 (2002).
3 Panel Report, European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos and
Asbestos-Containing Products, 8.283, WT/DS135/R (Sep. 18, 2000) [hereinafter EC-
Measures Affecting Asbestos], available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/wto
panels/ec-asbestos(panel).pdf.
340 Id. 18.289; see also Japan-Measures Affecting Consumer Film, supra note 329,
10.61 ("[F]or expectations to be legitimate, they must take into account all measures of the
party making the concession that could have been reasonably anticipated at the time of the
concession.").





no longer unforeseeable."" In light of scientific developments and the actions of
other Member States, the Panel concluded that Canada failed to present detailed
justifications to support its claim that it could not have anticipated a French import
ban on asbestos. 3 4 5
As applied to the security context, the fact that Article XXI is self-judging
precludes a finding that security measures violate WTO obligations. But it does not
prevent a WTO panel from finding that a benefit has been nullified or impaired
because of these measures. In some cases, such as the Arab League boycott of
Israel or the United States boycott of Cuba, it will be difficult for a Member State
to argue that it had any reasonable expectations of WTO benefits. In such contexts,
security measures often pre-date any tariff concessions, and subsequent security
measures are to be anticipated in light of past practices.
By contrast, Saudi Arabia's accession commitment to end the secondary
boycott against Israel is a trade benefit that gives rise to legitimate expectations.
In the event Saudi Arabia reinstates a secondary boycott against Israel, anticipated
trade benefits would be nullified or impaired, and a Member State could bring a
non-violation claim. Subsequent WTO accession negotiations with other Arab
League countries also could create legitimate expectations that they will not
impose a primary or secondary boycott against Israel.
Likewise, Member States should anticipate the imposition of trade measures
to protect national security interests or to restore international peace and security.
If a Member State uses force offensively, it can anticipate that other Member
States will respond with trade measures that impair WTO benefits. A belligerent
Member State has no legitimate expectation that normal trade relations will
continue in a state of war or other international emergency. Similarly, with the
rising threat of international terrorism Member States can be expected to impose
sanctions against a State sponsoring terrorism. A non-violation claim is
unavailable under these circumstances.
On the other hand, a bad faith invocation of the security exception that cannot
reasonably be anticipated may give rise to a successful non-violation claim.
Member States cannot be expected to anticipate trade barriers imposed because of
a purported international emergency that does not in fact exist. Nor can they
anticipate export or import controls under Article XXI(b)(ii) on goods that do not
have military applications. In such circumstances, there would be no obligation to
remove the trade measures, but a non-violation claim could provide an appropriate
remedy.
IV. WHY NATIONS OBEY THE SECURITY EXCEPTION
This Article posits that State practice supports a self-judging interpretation of
the security exception. Because it is the only self-judging exception in the WTO, it
344 Id.
345 Id. 8.301.
346 See supra text accompanying notes 183-190.
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poses grave risks for the institution, with the potential to be the loose thread that
unravels the entire fabric of compliance. If Member States can invoke a WTO
exception to all trade obligations at their sole discretion, the potential for abuse is
enormous. But despite the risks, the exception is surprisingly uncontroversial.
Member States routinely and voluntarily comply with textual limits of the security
exception, 34 7 or if they do not, their actions are almost never challenged before
GATT/WTO adjudicative bodies.348
As discussed in the previous section, part of the reason Member States
comply with the limits of the security exception may be because the WTO
provides other avenues to advance security interests. 34 9 But these mitigating factors
are unlikely to offer a complete answer to sixty years of security crises. There must
be more to Member State conduct than simply ease of compliance.
The general and consistent practice of complying with a self-judging rule
raises larger issues beyond the WTO. While the self-judging nature of Article XXI
remains contested, it is undeniable that it has been invoked at the sole discretion of
the Member States. As such, it provides a useful prism through which to consider
theories of international law compliance. Unlike almost every other aspect of the
WTO, there is no obvious sanction for ignoring its textual limits. So why does a
State typically invoke Article XXI(b)(ii) to restrict military and dual-use goods, but
not purely civilian products? Why does a State not declare virtually every crisis-
economic, political, social, or military-an "emergency in international relations"
under Article XXI(b)(iii)? Why does a State not consider virtually any national
policy an "essential security interest"? With billions of dollars at stake in WTO
litigation,350 why not invoke the security exception in bad faith? In short, what is to
prevent Article XXI from becoming the exception that swallows the rule?
347 See supra Part I.
348 Id
349 id.
350 Of the nineteen Article 22.6 Arbitration Decisions authorizing the prevailing
Member State to suspend concessions (i.e., raise tariffs equal to the harm suffered), over
half a dozen have exceeded $100 million per year, and one exceeded $4 billion per year.
See Panel Report, Brazil-Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, WT/DS46/R (Aug.
28, 2000) (awarding C$344 million per year in suspensions against Brazil); Panel Report,
Canada-Export Credits and Loan Guarantees for Regional Aircraft, WT/DS222/AB/R
(Feb. 17, 2003) (awarding US$248 million per year in suspensions against Canada); Panel
Report, European Communities-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products
(Hormones), WT/DS26/ARB (July 12, 1999) (awarding US$117 per year in suspensions
against the European Community); Panel Report, European Communities-Regime for the
Importation, Sale, and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R (Mar. 24, 2000)
(awarding US$202 million per year in suspensions against the European Community);
Panel Report, United States-Subsidies of Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/AB/R (Aug. 31,
2009) (awarding US$147.4 million per year in suspensions against United States); Panel
Report, United States-Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales Corporations,"




For almost fifty years under GATT and fifteen years under the WTO,
compliance has not been a cause for significant concern. Since 1995, the general
exceptions in Article XX have been the subject of WTO litigation at least twenty-
two times-one out of every six cases before the WTO. 35 ' During that same time
the.Article XXI security exception has not been invoked in WTO litigation a single
time.352 While there were ample opportunities to do so in bad faith, Member States
never sought to justify their behavior before a WTO panel on. the grounds that their
conduct fell within the terms of the security exception.
351 Panel Report, Argentina-Measures Affecting the Export of Bovine Hides,
WT/DS155/R (Aug. 31, 2001); Panel Report, Australia-Measures Affecting the
Importation of Apples from New Zealand, WT/DS367/R (Aug. 9, 2010); Panel Report,
Brazil-Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, WT/DS332/AB/R (Dec. 3, 2007);
Panel Report, Canada-Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, WT/DS3 1/AB/R (June
30, 1997); Panel Report, Canada-Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and Treatment
of Imported Grain, WT/DS276/AB/R (Aug. 30, 2004); Panel Report, China-Measures
Affecting Imports ofAutomobile Parts, WT/DS339, 340, 342/AB/R (Dec. 15, 2008); Panel
Report, China-Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain
Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, WT/DS363/AB/R (Dec. 21, 2009);
Panel Report, Colombia-Indicative Prices and Restrictions on Ports of Entry,
WT/DS366/AB/R (Apr. 27, 2009); Panel Report, Dominican Republic-Measures
Affecting the Importation and Internal Sale of Cigarettes, WT/DS302/AB/R (Apr. 25,
2005); Panel Report, European Communities-Antidumping Measure on Farmed Salmon
from Norway, WT/DS337/R (Nov. 16, 2007); Panel Report, European Communities-
Conditions for Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries, WT/DS246/AB/R
(Apr. 7, 2004); EC-Measures Affecting Asbestos, supra note 339; Panel Report, European
Communities-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS26,
DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998); Panel Report, European Communities-Protection of
Trademarks and Geographic Indications, WT/DS 174, DS290/AB/R (Mar. 15, 2004); Panel
Report, Korea-Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled, and Frozen Beef
WT/DS161, 169/AB/R (Dec. 11, 2000); Panel Report, Mexico-Measures Affecting
Telecommunications Services, WT/DS204/R (Apr. 2, 2004); Panel Report, Mexico-Tax
Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, WT/DS308/AB/R (Mar. 6, 2006); Panel
Report, United States-Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, WT/DS217,
234/AB/R (Jan. 16, 2003); Panel Report, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998); Panel Report, United
States-Measures Relating to Shrimp from Thailand, WT/DS343/AB/R (Feb. 29, 2008);
Panel Report, United States-Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling
and Betting Services, WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2005); Panel Report, United States-
Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996).
352 This is despite obvious opportunities to invoke the national security exception. For
example, Colombia could have defended its requirement that certain goods from Ecuador
arrive only through one seaport, Barranquilla, and one airport, Bogota, as valid security
measures in its ongoing battle against drug trafficking. It did not do so, and lost the case..
The WTO panel ruled that the port restrictions violated WTO rules and were not justified
under general exception Article XX(d). Panel Report, Colombia-Indicative Prices and
Restrictions on Ports of Entry, WT/DS366/R (Apr. 27, 2009).
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Three competing theories to explain why nations obey international law-
described here as the coercion theory, normative theory, and the rational choice
theory-may help clarify why Member States typically do not invoke the security
exception in bad faith.
A. Coercion Theory
The coercion theory assumes that States comply with an international
obligation because they are forced to do so. Coercion focuses on threats and force
in securing compliance, without regard to the normative content of the rule or
complex calculations of self-interest.353 Coercion may include either institutional
sanction or authorized self-help.354
At one level, coercion may explain Member States' high rate of compliance
with WTO decisions. The institution itself has no method of coercion, but it has an
elaborate procedure for self-help. Following the deadline for bringing a measure
into compliance, a Member State has the choice of either compensating the injured
Member State (which almost never occurs), or facing WTO-authorized suspension
of concessions, typically in the form of higher tariffs.355 The specter of severe
economic sanctions may be a key factor inducing compliance in over ninety
percent of the cases in which the WTO finds a violation.35 6
As applied to the security exception, the problem with this approach is
threefold. First, the sanction of self-help will often be ineffective in dealing with
security exception violations. The WTO sanctions regime assumes trade between
countries, which often is not the case when the security exception is involved. For
example, many Member States expressed concern that the Reagan administration
was not acting in good faith in imposing a trade embargo on Nicaragua.3 57 So too
did other countries when an embargo was imposed in the Falkland War.358
Assuming that a WTO panel reviewed such trade embargos and found a violation,
there would be no sanction for non-compliance. Nicaragua could not suspend
concessions (i.e., raise tariffs on U.S. products) because there were no such
products entering Nicaragua. A trade embargo banning all imports and exports
leaves the WTO impotent to coerce compliance.
Second, a strong majority of Member States interpret the security exception as
self-judging, and no judicial interpretation has concluded otherwise. As such, there
353 See, e.g., MARKUS BURGSTALLER, THEORIES OF COMPLIANCE WITH
INTERNATIONAL LAW 86 (2005); JOHN MEARSHEIMER, THE TRAGEDY OF GREAT POWER
POLITICS 86-87 (2001); HANS MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE
FOR POWER AND PEACE 49 (5th ed. 1978); KENNETH WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL
POLITICS 186 (1979); Stephen D. Krasner, State Power and the Structure of International
Trade, 28 WORLD POLITICS 317, 322 (1976).
354 MALCOLM SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 4, 848 (5th ed. 2003).
3 Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 152, art. 22.
356 See supra text accompanying notes 4-8.
357 See supra text accompanying notes 97-126.
358 See supra text accompanying notes 80-96.
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is no institution or Member State that can impose its will on others to coerce
compliance. If good faith compliance is what the Member State says it is, then
there will be no violation justifying coercion. An unreviewable rule precludes a
formal finding of a violation, which precludes coercion to secure compliance. A
non-violation claim is theoretically possible, but it rarely has been invoked and
never in the context of the security exception.359
Third, to date there has been no instance of a sanction imposed for a security
exception violation. If no violation has ever been found, and no sanction ever
imposed, it is unlikely that coercion explains compliance. Of course, grave abuse
of the security exception could result in a future WTO interpretation that imposes
real sanctions, either in the form of good faith review or reliance on an objective
standard.360 No State can simply assume that the security exception will always be
unreviewable. As with most domestic sanctions, the mere threat of enforcement, in
many circumstances, may be enough to induce compliance. But because a
violation of the security exception has never been found, the fear of sanction is
unlikely to promote compliance.
B. Normative Theory
Normative understandings of compliance maintain that States honor
international law commitments because of a belief that the rules are authoritative
and binding. On this theory, States are committed to rules qua rules. Sanctions are
useful, but not essential to secure compliance. Sanctions do more than coerce, they
identify norms as legally binding and play a role in internalizing respect for the
legal rules. 36 1 "The application of sanctions reminds others that sanctions exist,
which in turn, supports more voluntary law compliance . . . . Penalties or sanctions
... [promote] voluntary co-operation in a coercive system." 362 But a rule does not
necessarily require sanction for it to be law, for its status as law is recognized
through other indicia. These include the process through which a rule is formed; its
treatment as law by authoritative bodies; its formal integration within a legal
system that expects compliance; and its inherent normative legal validity.
Normative theories help explain compliance with an unreviewable rule. As for
sanctions as a signaling function, even if the security exception is self-judging,
Member States voluntarily act as if its limits are real. Perhaps they do so because
they are acting in the shadow of sanction, with the self-judging rule surrounded by
other rules that are subject to sanction.36 3 This "sanctions environment" promotes
359 See Fernando & Razak, supra note 326; see also supra text accompanying note
326.
360 See supra text accompanying notes 48-49.
361 MARY ELLEN O'CONNELL, THE POWER AND PURPOSE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW:
INSIGHTS FROM THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF ENFORCEMENT 10 (2008).
362 Id. at 11 (quoting H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 193 (1961)).
363 For example, the General Exceptions in Article XX are the subject of extensive
WTO litigation. The process of invoking those exceptions assumes that they are binding
and subject to WTO sanction for non-compliance. The Article XXI security exception is
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the legitimacy of the rule. The possibility of sanction supports an interpretation of
the norm as a legal obligation deserving respect.
The process of formation also supports the security exception's legal status.
Its incorporation within a formal multilateral treaty enhances its status as law,
despite the fact that it is a self-judging rule. As part of a treaty, norms of
compliance-pacta sunt servanda-are triggered: "Every treaty in force is binding
upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith."3 64 A rule
embedded within a formal treaty that is supported by a formal institution gives it
legitimacy, which exerts a pull toward compliance.365
Pronouncements from authoritative bodies further support Member State
compliance with the limits of the security exception. During the many debates at
GATT Council meetings, there was unanimous agreement that Member States
should only invoke the exception in good faith. Likewise, the non-binding GATT
Panel report in United States-Trade Measures Affecting Nicaragua presumes that
Member States will comply with their trade obligations and encourages Member
States to adopt a formal interpretation of the security exception. Both diplomatic
and judicial pronouncements promote good faith compliance.366 While not binding,
they enhance the normative value of the security exception.
The formal integration of the security exception within the WTO regime
strongly reinforces Member State compliance. Despite its status as a self-judging
exception, it is surrounded by rules backed with sanctions within a cooperative
system, creating a culture of compliance. To use H.L.A. Hart's terminology, the
WTO is a "system," not a mere "set of rules,"367 and that system includes a "rule of
recognition"-a standard by which rules are recognized as law.3 6 8 Moreover,
because the WTO is a legal system, even unenforceable rules within that regime
are given legal significance. The regular meetings of Member States at the GATT
and WTO Councils, in particular, illustrate the interactive process of justification,
369
discourse, and persuasion that promotes compliance.
Finally, the limitations on the security exception have inherent legal validity:
it stipulates how a State "ought" to act.3 70 As Hans Kelsen would put it, what a
likely interpreted in the shadow of these other general exceptions.
364 Vienna Convention, supra note 55, art. 26.
365 THOMAS FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 24 (1990).
366 Panel Report, United States-Trade Measures Affecting Nicaragua, 5.5, 5.18,
L/6053 (Oct. 13, 1986).
367 H.L.A. HART, CONCEPT OF LAW 213-37 (2d ed. 1994); NEIL MACCORMACK,
H.L.A. HART 138 (2d ed. 2008).
368 HART, supra note 367, at I10.
369 For more on the "managerial model" of compliance, see ABRAM CHAYES &
ANTONIA CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL
REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 109-11 (1995). For a discussion of the "institutional
enmeshment" of the security exception within the WTO framework, see Andrew
Emmerson, supra note 44, at 149-53.
370 UTA BINDREITER, WHY GRUNDNORM?: A TREATISE ON THE IMPLICATIONS OF
KELSEN'S DOCTRINE 30 (2002).
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State "ought" to do reflects not only a command but also an authorization to
perform. 3 7 1 A State "ought" to carefully balance the competing policies of
protecting security needs and promoting stable trading relations.372 States
understand the validity of this compromise and act accordingly. It is a self-judging
rule, but it is honored (with a margin of appreciation) because it has internal
validity for the Member States.373 On this theory, States comply in part because
they have internalized the rule that the security exception should only be invoked
in good faith.374
Thus, traditional compliance theories go far toward explaining why the self-
judging security exception does not undermine the WTO. It is a self-judging rule
surrounded by rules backed by sanctions, giving it legitimacy. Its status as treaty
law creates expectations of good faith compliance. Its integration within a formal
legal system promotes Member State recognition of the security exception as a
legally enforceable rule. The rule is established within an institution that has
legitimacy and respect. The limits in the security exception are inherently logical,
reflecting a balance of competing interests that Member States understand and
internalize.
C. Rational Choice Theory
Rational choice scholars have offered a competing view for international law
compliance. Under this theory, States are rational, self-interested actors that do not
concern themselves with the welfare of other States or the legitimacy of a rule of
law, unless it fits into the States' overall interest-maximization calculus. 37 5 With
rational choice, there is no presumed preference for compliance. What States do
care about are their own gains or payoffs: they will comply with international law
if it is in their interest to do so. 3 76 Specifically, States comply with international
law because there are costs for non-compliance, particularly in terms of retaliation,
37 Id.
372 Panel Report, United States-Trade Measures Affecting Nicaragua, 15.16, L/6053
(Oct. 13, 1986), available at http://www.wto.org/gatt-docs/English/SULPDF/9124
0197.pdf.
3 For a discussion of internalization of international law norms, see Harold Koh,
Why Do Nations Obey International Law, 106 YALE L.J. 2599 (1997).
374 Id. at 2602.
37 See, e.g., ROBERT AXELROD, THE COMPLEXITY OF COOPERATION: AGENT-BASED
MODELS OF COMPETITION AND COLLABORATION 57-62 (1997); JACK GOLDSMITH & ERIc
POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 39 (2005); ANDREW GUZMAN, How
INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY 17 (2008); Robert Axelrod &
Robert Keohane, Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions, 38
WORLD POL. 226, 229 (1985); Robert Jervis, Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma, 30
WORLD POL. 167, 177 (1978).
376 See, e.g., AXELROD, supra note 375; GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 375;
GUZMAN, supra note 375; Axelrod & Keohane, supra note 375; Jervis, supra note 375.
2011] 755
UTAH LAW REVIEW
reciprocity, and reputation.3 77
Rational choice theorists have made generalized predictions as to why nations
comply with international law, and the WTO is often a favorite application of their
theory. 7  But rational choice theorists have never attempted to explain State
behavior with respect to self-judging exceptions. If compliance is all about
payoffs, then why do States not abuse an unreviewable rule?
As discussed above, part of the answer could be that States comply with the
limits of the security exception because of fear of sanction. Even if there is no
sanction, the possibility of sanction may be enough to tip the balance toward
compliance. But for rational choice theorists, this answer is insufficient because
the threat of sanction is not credible. Unlike almost every other aspect of WTO
law, the WTO's response to an Article XXI violation has never been tested. Every
time an alleged abuse of Article XXI has been challenged, something prevented a
formal institutional response. The WTO has general credibility for punishing
violators, but not for punishing alleged Article XXI violators.
Alternatively, reciprocity may explain good faith compliance with the security
exception. States do not abuse the security exception because doing so will
encourage other States to do the same. This may explain why economically
powerful States are careful in how they invoke the security exception against other
powerful States. But it does not explain unreasonable invocations against
powerless States. Though, as noted above, some weaker States argue that that is
precisely what happens.379
A broader understanding of reciprocity, however, would say that States enjoy
reciprocal benefits from enforceable trade rules. The cost of non-compliance with
the security exception-even when invoked against powerless States-is a
weakening of the entire system. The genius of the WTO is that it is a system of
mutually reciprocal concessions. The State is committed to maintain this system
because of the benefits it receives from enforceable trade rules. The cost of non-
compliance is the diminished credibility of an institution that provides the State
with significant benefits.
Reciprocity also may explain why injured States do not challenge more
dubious invocations of the security exception. Almost every State will have an
interest in invoking the security exception at one time or another. Perhaps Saudi
Arabia cannot justify its primary boycott against Israel on security grounds. But
reciprocity motivates Israel to leave the question ambiguous, broadening the scope
of its authority to act in its own security interests.
As for reputation, the cost of non-compliance is that a State earns a reputation
as an unreliable trading partner. Reputational costs may explain why States will
push the envelope on the security exception, but go no further. As detailed above,
there are numerous examples in which it is difficult, but not impossible, to argue
3 GUZMAN, supra note 375, at 33-34.
378 Id. at 7, 163-70; Marc Busch & Eric Reinhardt, Bargaining in the Shadow of the
Law: Early Settlement in GATT/WTO Disputes, 24 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 158, 168 (2000).
379 See supra text accompanying notes 117-118.
[No. 3756
WTO SECURITY EXCEPTION
that a trade restriction is necessary for essential security interests. What we almost
never see are invocations of the security exception where it is impossible that a
trade barrier is applied for security reasons. In dozens of cases, States will invoke
general exceptions to justify their behavior, but not argue that the security
exception applies.380
Of course, under a rational choice model, reputation for compliance matters
least when the stakes are large. 38 The security exception falls at the intersection of
high-stakes benefits for advancing security interests and low-stakes reputational
costs of non-compliance with trade obligations. Moreover, this cost may be
diminished because the reason for a violation-promoting security concerns-
alters the magnitude of reputational cost.382 Member States will be more forgiving
of a WTO violation when the stakes are high, which undermines the argument that
reputational costs explain the high rate of security exception compliance.
Finally, rational choice theory may explain compliance with the security
exception on the basis of the low cost of compliance. The security exception is
broad enough to cover most security concerns, and to the extent it is not, the WTO
provides other means for a State to address security concerns. The mitigating
factors outlined above afford significant freedom of action, while remaining in
compliance with WTO obligations. In other words, the reason for effective
compliance with Article XXI is that the standards for compliance are so low. 383 On
this theory, bad faith invocations are rare because they are rarely necessary.
Thus, rational choice theory offers a competing, persuasive theory for
compliance. Reciprocity and reputation, in particular, go far toward explaining
why nations comply with the limits of the security exception.
V. CONCLUSION
In The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith identified only one type of
government action that justified a departure from free trade: laws designed to
protect national defense.384 Under the Act of Navigation, Great Britain adopted a
trade embargo against Holland, prohibiting Dutch ships from trading with the
British settlements or with the British Isles. 8 According to Smith, the effect of
these laws was to exclude the Dutch, "the great carriers of Europe ... from being
380 See supra text accompanying notes 61-62, 116-17.
381 Andrew Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 CALIF. L.
REV. 1823, 1883 (2002).
382 Id. at 1862.
383 On effectiveness versus compliance, see Kal Raustiala & Anne-Marie Slaughter,
International Law, International Relations, and Compliance, in HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 538, 539 (Walter Carlsnaes et al. eds., 2003).
384 ALBERTO HIRSCHMAN, NATIONAL POWER AND THE STRUCTURE OF FOREIGN
TRADE 5 (1945).




the carriers to Great Britain." 386 When these laws were passed, Smith wrote, while
"England and Holland were not actually at war, the most violent animosity
subsisted between the two nations."387 Although born of national animosity, these
laws were "as wise . . . as if they had all been directed by the most deliberate
wisdom . . . which . . . recommended the diminution of the naval power of
Holland, the only naval power which could endanger the security of England."
Of course, the navigation laws were "not favourable to foreign commerce, or to the
growth of that opulence which can arise from it."3 89 But "as defense ... is of much
more importance than opulence . . . the act of navigation is, perhaps, the wisest of
all commercial regulations of England." 3 90
The WTO security exception carries forward Adam Smith's great insight:
defense is more important than free trade. The security exception is an anomaly, a
unique provision in international trade law that grants the Member States freedom
to avoid trade rules to protect national security. In the long history of GATT and
the short history of the WTO, that freedom has never been challenged seriously.
Member States understand the exception to be self-judging, and presume that it
will be exercised with wisdom and in good faith.
Thus far, the record has been impressive. While no doubt there have been
departures, the self-judging security exception has worked reasonably well. It
certainly has not undermined the effective functioning of the WTO. The
overwhelming majority of security measures are unregulated by international trade
law, and those few that have been challenged were never reviewed. International
trade law, viewed by many as the most effective and intrusive branch of
international law, has preserved one enclave of complete national sovereignty.
There are many possible explanations for its success. Its ambit is sufficiently broad
to cover most security concerns, and it is reinforced by other WTO provisions that
facilitate compliance.
A self-judging rule that Member States honor provides helpful insights into
broader questions regarding nations obeying other international laws. Any number
of theories, including traditional normative theories of compliance, and more
controversial rational choice theories that focus on national self-interest, can
explain the strong compliance record. The one theory that has little explanatory
power is a pure coercion theory. Whatever may be motivating Member States to
respect the limits of the security exception, it is not fear of sanction.
Widespread compliance with an unreviewable, self-judging rule suggests




388 Id. at 40-41.




perhaps international law is at present in a stage of transition toward
acceptance . . . which would bring it nearer in structure to a municipal
system. If, and when, this transition is completed the formal analogies,
which at present seem thin and even delusive, would acquire substance,
and the skeptic's last doubts about the legal 'quality' of international law
may then be laid to rest.3 9'
At least with respect to international trade law, it appears such a transition has
already occurred.
391 HART, supra note 367, at 236-37.
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